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Introduction1 
 
The goal of this work is to present a further step toward a general model of semiosis rooted 
in Saussurean semiology and current biosemiotic theories. The nature of this aim can be 
explained from two complementary points of view. Namely, the ones provided by 
biosemiotics on the one hand and general semiotics on the other. On the biosemiotic side, 
this work revolves around Terrence Deacon’s theory of emergent dynamics and its attempt 
to provide a naturalistic explanation of semiosis. Deacon is a neuroscientist, and his 
approach to semiotics can be characterized as mainly Peircean. His term ententionality 
amounts to the generalization of semiosis beyond the realm of the mental; it aims to include 
teleological behavior of any kind. Ententionality is an emergent property of systems 
exhibiting a particular kind of organization that enables goal directed activity, 
teleodynamics in Deacon’s terminology. However, from a general semiotics point of view, 
the question becomes how to include Deacon’s ideas into a general model of semiosis 
rooted in structural thinking? 
The goal of Deacon’s enterprise largely coincides with the goal of biosemiotics as 
such. Regarding ententionality, the importance of intentionality for semiotics was already 
suggested within biosemiotics by Hoffmeyer (2012) and in general semiotics by Deely 
(2007). The appearance of ententional properties is necessary for semiosis, and thus, the 
problems addressed by Deacon gravitate quite near from biosemiotic research about the 
semiotic threshold. There has been much work conducted in this field, for instance 
Rodríguez Higuera and Kull's (2017) work on the semiotic threshold, Nöth (2001) studies 
on physicosemiosis, Kull’s (2014b) approach to Peircean notion of habit, to name a few. 
The teleological properties of semiosis have been as well tackled by a variety of authors, 
for instance, Short (2007) in his studies about Peirce’s semiotics (which also includes a 
                                                          
1
 A large part of this thesis was presented in the article “Ententionality and Pertinence: Framing End-
Directedness within Two Semiotic Theories”(Chávez Barreto 2018) written during the second half of 2017 
and published in Biosemiotics. The main thesis advanced in that article is still the same one advanced here. 
The thesis follows the same structure of the article and it reproduces some passages of it, but several changes 
have been made to a number of sections. 
6 
 
section on intentionality and Peirce) and Victoria Alexander’s (2009) reworking of Short’s 
ideas on teleology. A very close topic, namely that of anticipation, and anticipatory 
systems, has been specially analyzed by Rosen (2012). Within semiotics, anticipation has 
been treated by Nadin (2010, 2012) and Kull (1998), among others. In a slightly different 
way these problems have been tackled from the point of view of the sign structure proper to 
semiosis at the lower levels; e.g. the works on protosemiosis as treated by Sharov and 
Vehkavaara (2015), and the different types of semiosis as treated by Barbieri (2009).  
The second theory with which this work is dealing is that of Luis Prieto. Prieto was 
a linguist and a semiotician. He occupied Saussure’s chair of general linguistics at Geneva 
from 1969 until his death in 1996. Prieto thought of semiology as a discipline that should 
explain the raison d’être of knowledge in general (as seen in Prieto 1993, 1991). 
Knowledge in general was, from his point of view, the whole of anthroposemiosic 
phenomena (i.e. semiosis within the limits of human beings’ capacities). The central notion 
to explain knowledge was pertinence, since, according to Prieto, to know always implies to 
act in some way; since knowing is a practice it can be conceived as relations between goals 
and means to achieve those goals which are brought together by relations of pertinence. 
The main idea this work is trying to present is that Prieto’s model of semiosis, articulated 
by his notion of pertinence, can be effectively used as general models of semiosis that 
include the whole of knowledge as this notion is treated in contemporary semiotics after 
Sebeok’s conclusion that life and semiosis are coextensive. However, in order to develop 
Prieto’s model in such direction, Deacon’s ideas must be integrated. It is important to 
notice that although Prieto was structuralist, some of his ideas were more close to an even 
pragmaticist point of view; in this sense, the commonalities between the ideas of Prieto and 
Peirce have been presented in several occasions by Emanuella Fadda (2004, 2012). The 
relation between semiotics and cognition, in Prieto’s and Peirce’s theories, has been 
characterized by Fadda as an overlapping; he states that both theories are concerned with 
semiosis as an inherently cognitive process (Fadda 2004: 40). In a similar way he has 
suggested that the relation between pertinence and practice in Prieto’s thought is very 
similar with Peirce’s pragmatic maxim (Fadda 2004: 225-227). On the other hand, critiques 
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to the position of Prieto regarding his structural oriented interlocutors have been presented 
by both Fadda (2002) and Badir (2001). Other authors from the structural tradition have 
been more present in cognitive semiotics, including Prieto in some of the works of Göran 
Sonesson (1996), but not directly in biosemiotics
2
. Eco (2007) has referred to the affinity of 
Prieto’s ideas on pertinence to Sperber’s relevance, and Gibson’s affordances. 
On the other hand, the interplay between Peircean semiotics and Saussurean 
inspired semiotics is almost absent from biosemiotics (the notion of code being probably 
one important exception), although not in general semiotics. Some issues regarding the 
relation of both structural linguistics and semiology to biosemiotics have been treated in 
Velmezova et al. (2015). In this sense, this work aims to contribute to theoretical 
biosemiotics by bringing a new author into the field. 
This work is structured in the following manner: The first chapter presents the 
concept of intentionality and how it relates to our authors. The focus of this chapter is to 
present the scholastic idea of cognitive intentionality both as specification of the senses and 
as a union between the knower and the known, and how it relates to our analysis of 
Deacon’s and Prieto’s theories. The second chapter presents Deacon’s theory of emergent 
dynamics. We first introduce the notion of ententionality and discuss its relations to 
semiosis and teleology. Toward the end of the chapter, we start presenting the articulation 
of ententionality and pertinence via two corollaries derived from our exposition. Some of 
the relations Deacon’s work has with the notions of semiotic freedom and logical conflict 
as posited by Hoffmeyer and Kull respectively, are also analyzed at the light of the concept 
of pertinence. The third chapter presents Prieto’s semiotic theory. We start by analyzing the 
relations between form and substance in structural semiotics, and then we move forward to 
Prieto’s mechanism of indication in order to illustrate his model of semiosis. Afterwards we 
                                                          
2
 It is important to mention that interest in classical biosemiotics works, like those of Uexküll, and current 
bio- and zoosemiotic research is nowadays gaining more attention in French semiotics, as can be seen in the 
recently organized Colloque d’Albi in Toulouse, France by the research group Médiations Sémiotiques. The 
topic of the congress is “Biology, Ethology and Semiotics, The living and their environment”. The committee 
for the congress includes researchers like Alessandro Zinna, a renowed Hjelmslev scholar, Jacques Fontanille, 
who was a close collaborator of A. Greimas, and Denis Bertrand. 
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discuss his cognitive model, and we conclude by showing how teleodynamics can fit in 
Prieto’s theory. 
Finally, the last chapter presents a small synthetic view on our first step toward a general 
model of semiosis that brings Deacon and Prieto together. 
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0. Basic Concepts 
 
 
0.1. Intentionality 
 
The main topic of this work is intentionality as seen from a semiotic point of view. Before 
we start, this notion has to be defined. The problem is that intentionality can be understood 
in very broad and diverse senses, and it has very different connotations and scopes 
according to different authors. From Husserl to Searle, and from Brentano to Deely and 
semiotics, intentionality refers to the intrinsic aboutness of manifold phenomena, but it can 
be taken to denote some properties of mental states, some directionality of the mind, some 
features of cognitive processes, and so on. It is important to mention that, regarding this 
problem, Favareau and Gare (2017) have already provided an overview of the ways 
intentionality have been used in biosemiotics research, which constitutes the immediate 
field to which this research ascribes
3
. 
It was only towards the end of the XIXth century when intentionality began to be 
used in the contemporary sense we now use it, or at least in a closer one. It was Franz 
Brentano who introduced the notion of intentionality to the twentieth century as “the mark 
of the mental”4 (cf. Hoffmeyer 2012). In this work, intentionality will be understood in a 
                                                          
3
 It is well beyond the scope of my capacities to deal in its full extent with the bio side of biosemiotics, I am 
more qualified to analyze the purely semiotic side of it. Therefore, the aim of this work is rather modest: it 
does not attempt to say anything new about the semiotic explanation of life as such; instead it attempts to use 
the semiotic claims that biosemiotics can provide and utilize them as useful claims upon which a general 
theory of semiosis can be either built, or improved. It is in this sense that the work presented here stands 
somewhat in the threshold between biosemiotics and general semiotics. 
4
 Brentano’s original passage reads as follows:  
“Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional 
(or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to 
a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent 
objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do 
so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in 
love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively 
of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We can, therefore, define mental 
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sense closer to the Scholastic usage of it. Let us make a small remark regarding how the 
notion of intentionality has been historically used in order to express clearly what we mean 
by it. 
It is well acknowledged that the term as such had its origins in Scholastic Philosophy, 
and that it continued to be used even by the post-medieval scholastic thinkers of the 
Renaissance (as Deely 2007 shows when discussing Poinsot). The idea expressed by 
intentionality can, nevertheless, be traced back to Aristotle (Favareau and Gare 2017, 
Klima 2013, Deely 2007, Knudsen 2000), but the word itself, i.e. intentio, “is associated 
with two concepts that occur already in the writings of Al-farabi and Avicenna, where they 
are associated with the words "ma'qul" and "ma'na", both of which were translated into 
Latin as ‘intentio’[…] Al-farabi understands by "ma'qul" — his translation of the Greek 
word 'noema' — a concept or a thought that has to be examined by the logician in two 
respects: in its relation to things outside the soul and in its relation to words.” (Knudsen 
2000: 479). Interestingly enough, during the middle ages, intentionality was used for 
referring to any kind of directedness or aboutness, i.e. to anything that could function as a 
sign vehicle, and thus to anything that could convey information about something other 
than itself (probably without being too restrictive as to what a sign vehicle, or plainly a 
sign, can actually be, or actually is). Klima illustrates this point when he writes: 
Thus, for instance, when Aquinas tells us that colors are in the senses in esse 
intentionale as opposed to esse reale, the real being they have in the wall, he seems to 
be in perfect agreement with Brentano’s thesis; but when he says that the same colors 
also have esse intentionale in the air, the medium between the perceiver and the 
perceived thing, then we should begin to suspect that by intentionality he means 
something altogether different from the notion involved in Brentano’s thesis. (Klima 
2013: 2)  
Klima refers to Brentano’s thesis as “the psychological myth of intentionality” and in order 
to demonstrate to what extent it is a myth, he goes on to show that intentionality, in the 
scholastic sense, amounts to any transfer of information. The argument he advances for 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object intentionally within themselves” 
(Brentano 1995: 68). 
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showing how esse intentionale can be found in physical process reproduces that of Aristotle 
and Aquinas, but it actually stresses a very deep and not yet definitely solved semiotic 
problem, namely, what does it takes for a sign to actually be a sign, and it seems to me that 
his point of view has to be thoroughly examinated (although sadly, we won’t be able to 
pursue such examination in this work). Briefly stated, Klima’s argument, always following 
his interpretation of Aquinas and Aristotle, appeals to the semiosic capacities of mere 
indexical signs, such as the impression of a signet ring in a piece of wax. The wax after the 
impression, and by means of it, becomes an information carrier; let us say a sign vehicle 
standing for the signet ring itself (or for the design of the signet ring): this is the realm of 
esse intentionale discussed by Klima following Aquinas and Aristotle; the ring, or its 
shape, exists as esse intentionale in the wax (cf. Klima 2013: 3, 12-13). Transfer of 
information in this sense is easily extensible through the entire physical world, and as such 
it can lead to the positing of physiosemiosis. On the other hand, and from a proper semiotic 
standpoint, Deely himself seemed to be well aware of this issue when, in his book 
Intentionality and Semiotics, A History of Mutual Fecundation, he writes that: 
while I concentrate here on the intentionality of consciousness in its semiotic 
implications and overtones, there is always at the back of my mind Maritain’s 
tantalizing suggestions that intentionality bespeaks a being that is broader than the 
phenomena of consciousness, a mode of being that is broader than the phenomena of 
consciousness, a mode of being at play even in nature itself beyond the animal 
sphere. (Deely 2007:xxviii) 
The whole problem, it seems, consists in the place that intersubjectivity (in Deely’s usage, 
which seems close to secondness in the Peircean sense) has in semiosis. Deely has pointed 
out that intersubjectivity is not yet semiosic, and could never be, for it lacks mediation, i.e. 
thirdness (Deely 2009). Nevertheless, if knowledge starts in sense-perception, there should 
be a way to ground knowledge in physical relations. In this sense, it is an asset for us to 
accept some of the basic tenets of the scholastic view on intentionality, for then we can 
ground (semiosic) relations in esse reale. But this also brings the latent danger of some 
form of pansemiosis, especially when it comes to habits and regularities (cf. Deely 
2009:165.).  
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This is a very critical point, especially regarding physiosemiosis, and the broader 
Deelyian notion of vis a prospecto. When he talks about semiosis beyond the realm of the 
living, he claims that in the physical relations prior to the upcoming of life, there is a 
certain “spark”, something that can be potentially semiosic but it does not become fully 
actualized as proper semiosis (he calls it virtual, Deely 2009: 143, 2014: 394-96). Under a 
possible interpretation, one could suggest that Deely is referring to something like 
autocatalysis
5
. But, against Deely, we could ask whether the conditions of existence of 
semiosis need to be, in any sense, semiosic as well. Imagine a jacket; the cloth and the 
thread are not the jacket. To make the jacket, you need cloth and thread, but I am not sure 
to which extent one could say that the jacket exists virtually in the cloth and thread. The 
jacket might exist potentially in the cloth and thread as different from the jacket. Yet, for 
the jacket to exist potentially, the cloth and the thread have to be taken as the jacket’s raw 
materials (by someone). The main issue seems to be that semiosic properties are emergent 
properties, but, can we refer to the set of interactions and relationships from which it 
emerges as semiosic too? At which point semiosis actually ends (or starts)? 
The works of Rodríguez Higuera (2016a, 2016b) have treated this problem 
extensively, particularly the emergence of semiosis (2016b) and the construction of a 
minimal semiosis model (2016a). As we said before, we are not able to fully approach this 
problem on this work, so we refer the discussion to Rodríguez Higuera’ works. For us, it 
suffices to say that the problem is unresolved at least to some extent in general semiotics 
and it is of major importance for its philosophical foundations (cf. Rodríguez Higuera 
2016b). 
On the other hand, it seems possible to make an objection to Deely that can leave us 
with a peace of mind. The objection is mainly this: for a sign to be a sign and to actually 
function as an information carrier there must be some sort of subject which can actively 
interpret the sign precisely as a sign (cf. Hoffmeyer 2012: 105), i.e. a third entity for which 
the sign functions properly as a kind of mediation. From this point of view, it is hard to see 
how any sort of mediation might be found in merely physical process; and thus, we do not 
                                                          
5
 Or probably to constraints, as the term is used by Deacon. We will return to this point in the next chapter.  
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see how without a subject a given thing can come to stand for another. Pure physicality 
lacks an interpretant, this is the whole point. 
Now, this objection, and our implicit acceptance of Sebeok’s conclusion that life and 
semiosis are coextensive, is not in direct opposition with the scholastic theory of 
intentionality we were originally introducing. The scholastic view did include a special 
kind of intentionality named specifically cognitive intentionality that takes the agency of 
the cognizer subject in consideration. In this sense, Klima reminds us:  
what fundamentally distinguishes cognitive intentionality for Aquinas from non-
cognitive physical phenomena is not that physical phenomena lack intentionality, but 
rather that cognitive intentionality is exhibited by cognitive subjects, which besides 
merely receiving information are capable of actively processing and utilizing it in 
their vital operations (Klima 2013: 3).  
This point was also stressed by Deely, especially when discussing the connections between 
esse intentionale and a general theory of relations (which include signs as ontological 
relations) and the role they both play when describing umwelten (cf. Deely 2007: 171). It 
seems a plausible conclusion to say that only to the extent that intentionality includes 
cognition (or some kind of agency, even if rudimentary) it can be considered as semiosis, 
and thus the study of cognitive intentionality, then, becomes seemingly the same thing as 
the study of forms of knowing, which is nothing else than semiotics (cf. Kull 2014a, Kull 
2009b, Sebeok 1991). 
Thus, from the scholastic point of view this research revolves around cognitive 
intentionality. As such, we will follow the idea that intentionality supposes a kind of 
specification of the senses, as the shape of a ring specifies the shape of the piece of wax 
upon which it is impressed, to borrow Deely’s words:  
the effect of a stimulus here and now active upon a sense organ and placing it in 
relation with the here and now active source existing on the same material level as the 
sense organ itself being transactionally stimulated and “specified” toward the source 
of stimulation. The form carried by the stimulus specifies the response of the organ to 
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objectify [i.e. bring into awareness - I.C.] this rather than that aspect of the 
surrounding environment. (Deely 2007: 27) 
This process of specification, that ultimately consists in an “immediate union between the 
knower and the known” (cf. Hoffmeyer 2012) involves active interaction of an organism 
with its surrounding environment; it is an action which can very well be termed “knowing”. 
As Kull (2014a) points out “knowing is always an activity”. 
The question of whether there is such a thing as non-cognitive (i.e. physical) 
intentionality is, as stated before, beyond the scope of this work, and we deny, in principle, 
that something like intentionality, in the outlined sense, can be ascribed to physical 
phenomena. Hence we would not regard the electromagnetic radiations (of various 
wavelengths) in the air, i.e. colors as prior to cognitive apprehension, as being esse 
intentionale or we would not ascribe any intentionality to the physical phenomena of sugar 
dissolving into water. We will thus confine ourselves to treat intentionality primarily as an 
attribute of the living (and, against Brentano, not solely of the mental, thus, in our view, 
life, semiosis and intentionality are all three coextensive). The main reason for doing so is 
the minimal requirement of there being some form of “agent” (be it a self or a subject in a 
very primitive sense) in any act of knowing, of interpretation, or in any act that consists in 
the retrieving of information; to say it more clearly: in any form of semiosis. 
While this will be our starting point for defining intentionality, it might be necessary 
to revise it at some points. It is, nevertheless, a good definition from where to start our 
work. 
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0.2. From Intentionality to Ententionality 
 
Defined in this way, intentionality can be located at the core of semiotic inquiry; it is only 
be means of intentionality as an effective attribute of living organisms that semiosis can 
actually happen. If this is true, then a general semiotic theory should, (a) be concerned with 
the elaboration of a general model of semiosis that could provide a thorough explanation of 
semiosis and its limits, or thresholds as they are usually called (Rodríguez, Kull 2017), and 
(b) rely to a large extent in biosemiotics for defining primarily the lower thresholds of 
semiosis, i.e. to differentiate between the minimal form of semiosis and the realm where 
semiosis no longer occurs. This question can very well amount to the place of semantics 
within a minimal model of semiosis, as Rodríguez Higuera (2016a) has put it. 
As we go deeper in biosemiotics, the problem becomes that of explaining mind 
naturalistically as Hoffmeyer puts it (Hoffmeyer 2012: 104). This problem, of course, calls 
for a natural history of intentionality (Hoffmeyer 2012). It is in this sense that Terrence 
Deacon’s theory of emergent dynamics becomes important for our research. In the first 
chapter of this work, we will deal extensively with Deacon’s theory, for now it suffices to 
introduce briefly his notion of ententionality and show in which sense it relates to 
intentionality as we have defined it. 
Ententionality, as posited by Deacon, aims to broaden the domain of intentionality 
beyond the realm of the mental. It amounts to a seeming reduction of cognitive 
intentionality as we defined it earlier, down to the very basic idea of end-directed behavior 
as a defining property of the living; the living tout court, starting with cells. The 
specification of the senses we mentioned earlier is left to the organizational constraints of a 
system. 
Thus ententionality presupposes a rudimentary mechanism that can be equated with 
that of cognitive intentionality. Such mechanism is properly described by Deacon’s theory 
of emergent dynamics. The theory of emergent dynamics consists on nested levels of 
16 
 
organization that are involved in the shaping of a system and that ultimately set the 
conditions for emergent properties to appear. One of such emergent properties is precisely 
ententionality. It is thus by means of organization, i.e. relations between the parts of a 
system, that a system can exhibit end-directed behavior. To put in more Deaconian words, 
organization permits the emergence of a system’s capacity to relate its intrinsic conditions 
with its extrinsic conditions to assure self preservation via ententionality. In this sense, 
ententionality simplifies cognitive intentionality, but at the same time, it widens its scope. 
At this level, knowing should be taken in a very general sense, perhaps only as 
classification, or categorization of some kind. 
The first chapter of this work, will elaborate on these ideas, and will explain 
thoroughly Deacon’s theory of ententionality and emergent dynamics.  
 
 
0.3. From Ententionality to Pertinence 
 
It follows from what we have said, that the pathway to a general model of semiosis which 
takes intentionality as its cornerstone needs to take into account not only the evolutionary 
steps towards end-directedness but it needs also to include the way in which intentional 
processes function as the building blocks of umwelten. We defined cognitive intentionality, 
following Deely, as depending upon a mechanism of specification (which turns out to be 
the backbone of intentional phenomena). This mechanism of specification, as we will show, 
depends on the intrinsic organization of a system (i.e. the nested levels of organization 
proposed by the theory of emergent dynamics). In this sense, our approach can be seen as 
structural, since it involves the relationship of parts and wholes, wherein the wholes are 
something more than the sum of its parts, i.e. the relationships among the parts. 
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The mechanism of specification presupposes some sort of capacity that enables the 
system to discriminate between the relevant and non relevant objects. We will claim that 
this capacity is actualized in the establishment of a pertinence principle. We take this idea 
from the works of Luis Prieto. The main thesis advanced in this work is that ententionality 
as such is dependent on a pertinence principle: the ability to make meaningful 
discriminations in the extrinsic conditions implies the possibility of there being end-
directedness. 
Simply stated; end-directedness supposes an ability to correlate means with goals in 
order to cope with an absence. The correlation between the classes of goals and the classes 
of means is very much determined by a class of absences; the relation tying these classes 
together is what we call pertinence (Prieto 1994). To put it briefly, pertinence expresses, in 
Prieto’s words, “the point of view from which a classification is made”. 
 
 
0.4. From Pertinence to Form and Substance 
 
The problems addressed so far, are very basic problems of semiotics. It seems to us that the 
tension between entia realia and entia rationis in semiosis should be the main axis of 
general semiotics, and it seems reasonable to say that this problem has been acknowledged 
in one way or another by the main thinkers of our discipline — and resolved in different 
ways. The structural tradition in semiotics, usually called semiology, and originating with 
Saussure, and finding further developers in Hjelmslev and Prieto, has tackled this issue 
under the dichotomy of form and substance. The terms as such are of course more ancient 
than semiology, they can be first of all associated with Aristotle, but since they have a 
technical meaning in semiological theory, it will be better to disregard for now the 
Aristotelian sense of such expressions. 
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The distinction between form and substance amounts, in a very general sense, to a 
distinction between mind dependent and mind independent reality. Form is generally 
understood as the systemic organization of a substance which exists beyond the system that 
informs it. The clearest example is that of the distinction between phonology, which 
corresponds to form, and phonetics, which corresponds to substance. The phonetic reality 
of a language is not at all equal to its phonological reality. The sounds produced by a 
speaker are always affected by the phonetic context in which they are produced so, for 
example, consonants might get palatalized before front vowels or velarized before back 
vowels, nasal consonants might be assimilated to the following consonant in its point of 
articulation, and so on. Not every one of these phonetic facts is necessarily relevant for the 
identity of a sound as an element of a language. The whole set of characteristics in the 
sound is a matter of substance, the set of distinctive features of the sound that constitutes its 
phonological identity is a matter of form. 
This is, all in all, a very rough way of characterizing these two terms, and to some 
extent it might even be imprecise, but it is sufficient for now, as we will deal in more detail 
with them in the second and third chapters of this work. The important thing to highlight is 
that this definition is very compatible with the way Prieto (1975) characterizes both terms. 
Every semiotic structure is thus necessarily mediating between form and substance. 
The work of a semiotic structure consists primarily in informing substance. But this is not a 
simple matter. In fact, by asking the question of how substance becomes form, one 
eventually arrives again to the problem of how to explain knowledge and cognitive 
intentionality. This problem was already stated by Prieto. The third chapter of his book 
Pertinence et pratique (1975) is dedicated to the problems of establishing a clear distinction 
between langue and parole (and this distinction can be very much related to that of form 
and substance), Prieto’s solution for doing this is ultimately to set the foundations of a 
semiologically inspired cognitive theory in what he calls the cognitive act (Prieto 
1975:113).  
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The cognitive model proposed by Prieto is, to a big extent, a generalization of the 
structural phonological model, especially as presented by Trubetzkoy, but it is as well 
deeply influenced by glossematics. The influence of these two schools is visible in the use 
of two notions as major components of the model: pertinence and manifestation. Pertinence 
is the centerpiece of a semiotic structure, as was stated in the preceding section, pertinence 
is what correlates means with goals, expression with content, and instruments with utilities 
(cf. Prieto 1975). Manifestation is logically previous to the establishment of pertinences, for 
manifestation is what permits the subject to recognize features in the objects of experience: 
manifestation is what correlates substance with form. Yet, manifestation, in Prieto’s sense, 
cannot explain how the trajectory from substance to form is made; it simply states that in 
the aesthesis of reality a subject recognizes features as manifested in substance, which 
becomes organized as form
6. How does this happens was not among Prieto’s concerns, but 
to us it is a very important matter. If Prieto’s model of cognition can actually be treated as a 
general model of semiosis, it needs to be able to explain general perception as it partakes in 
semiosis. It is at this point that ententionality needs to be brought into the picture. 
 
 
0.5. From Prieto to Deacon (and back) 
 
In general terms, these are the problems addressed by this work. It is by the very nature of 
the research and the chosen theoretical stance that it can be placed somewhere between 
biosemiotics and general semiotics; simply because it tries to articulate theories pertaining 
to different spectrums of our discipline, namely anthroposemiosis and biosemiosis. 
                                                          
6
 This point needs to be stressed. Contrary to the received view of Hjelmslev, in which form exists apart from 
substance and it gets manifested in it, in an almost platonic sense, Prieto claims that form is dependent on 
substance and they cannot be separated (Prieto 1975: 127). The material features of substance will be 
correlates of form, and form must always have material correlates, at least in the expression plane of a 
semiotic structure. 
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The top-down approach represented by integrating Deacon’s emergent dynamics 
into Prieto’s theory of cognition is the last step in a bottom-up trajectory that we will follow 
by starting our analysis near the lower semiotic threshold. We hope to show in this way that 
the rules governing the upper levels might be very productive in analyzing the lower levels 
of semiosis. 
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1. Ententionality 
 
 
1.1. Entention 
Ententionality is an analytical category that refers to living, cognitive and semiotic 
processes without making a distinction between them. According to Deacon, ententionality 
refers to phenomena which: 
[…] include functions that have satisfaction conditions, adaptations that have 
environmental correlates, thoughts that have contents, purposes that have goals, 
subjective experiences that have a self/other perspective, and values that have a self 
that benefits or gets harmed. (Deacon 2012: 27) 
The main feature held by all these phenomena is the fact that they all have, according to 
Deacon, an “internal relationship to a telos — an end, or otherwise displaced and thus non-
present something, or possible something” (Deacon 2012: 27; cf. Deacon and Sherman 
2007). Thus, ententional phenomena are such only because they possess what Deacon calls 
constituent absences (Deacon 2012: 23); they have something missing in its own 
constitution; in another words ententional phenomena are “intrinsically incomplete”. This 
basically means that they intrinsically refer to something other than themselves. In the 
glossary appended to his book, when defining ententional Deacon writes: 
A generic adjective coined […] for describing all phenomena that are intrinsically 
incomplete in the sense of being in a relationship to, constituted by, or organized to 
achieve something non-intrinsic. This includes function, information, meaning, 
reference, representation, agency, purpose, sentience and value (Deacon 2012: 549). 
Thus, ententionality as a generalization of intentionality, as aboutness, very much consists 
in extending the latter to the realm of life in general. Since ententional phenomena is 
incomplete, it is directed toward something, and this directedness amounts to the fact that 
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ententional phenomena is something more than physical processes (Deacon 2012: 190). 
The appearance of entention thus draws a distinction between a world of choices and values 
and a world of merely mechanic interactions.  
It is important to ask in which sense our notion of intentionality, as defined in the 
previous chapter, is compatible with this view. We have defined intentionality not only as 
the immediate union between knower and known; our definition involves a specification of 
the senses by the object of knowledge. Our definition of intentionality assumes semiosis. In 
order to see what the relations between intentionality and ententionality are in the context 
of this work, we need first to look at what are the relations between ententionality and 
semiosis. 
 
 
1.2. Teleology 
 
It is relevant to explain the relation of ententionality to semiosis, as categories of analysis. 
The point is that ententionality seems to be prior to semiosis. Before entention, there is no 
semiosis, for there is no incompleteness, and no need to assign values. Both semiosis and 
entention are properties of life, and the fundamental semiosic-ententional threshold is 
located by Deacon where life begins (Deacon 2012: 22, cf. Kull 2009a: 10). But from an 
analytical perspective, semiosis assumes ententionality. This problem was very indirectly 
addressed by Deacon (2015: 85) when commenting on the possibilities of developing a 
scientifically rigorous biosemiotic theory, the main problem for a scientific biosemiotic 
theory, he claims, is that semiotic analysis assumes teleology. There are two aspects 
involved in this claim. On the one hand, several approaches in biology and philosophy of 
mind disregard teleology as something that it needs to be explained, for the main 
assumption is that there is no teleology whatsoever in living, and thus mental, phenomena 
(cf. Deacon 2012: 84, 111-112). On the other hand, when incorporating semiotics to 
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biology, one is forced to explain the teleology implicit in semiosis at the lowest level, and 
not to only assume it. 
 Thus, at an analytical level, ententionality brings into the picture end directed 
processes without assuming proper mental agency; and, in this way, it can refer to minimal 
forms of semiosis and it can explain teleology. As both cognitive and life processes are 
unified by its inherent purposiveness and teleology: “the concept of mental purpose can be 
progressively decomposed, revealing weaker forms of this consequence-organized 
relationship that do not assume intrinsic mentality” (Deacon 2012: 25). Later, with respect 
to teleology, Deacon claims:  
As an analysis of the concept of teleology demonstrates, different ententional 
phenomena depend on, and are interrelated with, one another in an asymmetrical 
and hierarchichal way […] purposive behaviors depend on represented ends, 
representations depend on information relationships, information depends on 
functional organization, and biological functions are organized with respect to their 
value in promoting survival, well-being, and an organism’s reproductive potential. 
(Deacon 2012: 27) 
The problem of teleology is mainly that it supposes a seeming reversal of physical causality 
for “unrealized future possibilities appear to be the organizers of antecedent processes that 
tend to bring them into existence” (Deacon 2012: 109), and this, according to Deacon 
should be a big enough problem to rethink causality. It would seem as if future states could 
determine present states, but this is only apparent. As a matter of fact, there is no actual 
determination of the future in the present (Deacon 2012: 109), but this does not make less 
real the fact that a system might be organized as to achieve a given end, simply because the 
organization of a system can reduce the number of future states a system might be able to 
be in. To think about teleology as related to causality ultimately brings about the problem 
of evolution and the discussion of it in the biological sense. We would like to take the 
discussion in other direction and look at it from a more basic semiotic perspective. 
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From this point of view, it seems possible to formulate the main problem of 
teleology as the problem of assigning values to things in the world. At lower levels, it could 
be suggested that these values are merely related with needs; specific values might be 
assigned to things as they are able to fulfill an organism’s needs. Needs can be seen as 
recognized absences (Kull 2009a: 20). Absences, then, would have a central role both in 
teleology and consequently in ententional phenomena. In fact, in order to posit the 
existence, in the physical living realm, of something that is oriented towards something 
other than itself, one has to accept that a given organic system can be organized in respect 
to something that it is not there, to something absent, i.e. to a given end — which means to 
accept teleology on the one hand, and that every organism engages in semiosic activity on 
the other. 
Thus, by means of ententionality, an organism’s teleological capacities can be 
recognized as causing the shift from purely physical causation to another type of causation 
that goes “beyond” the physical. Granting casual powers to absence is what ultimately 
allows Deacon to explain this shift between mere intersubjectivity (understood in the 
specific sense that Deely attributes to this term; as physical, real, relations) and interactions, 
or relations over and above subjectivity (again, in Deely’s sense, i.e. proper semiosic 
relations, cf. Deely 2009). Let us now take a look to the role of absence in Deacon’s theory. 
 
 
1.3. Absentials and constraints 
 
Absential features or constituent absences are defined by Deacon as: “The paradoxical 
intrinsic property of existing with respect to something missing, separate, and possibly 
nonexistent” (Deacon 2012: 547). In a way, absential features get “realized” in a system’s 
organization as constraints. The notion of constraint is defined by Deacon as “what is not 
there but could have been” (Deacon 2012: 192). But, to say that constraints are somewhat 
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“realized absences” does not mean that absences are material; absences are immaterial 
inasmuch as they are not there at all, but at the same time, they play an active role in 
determining a system’s organization, for that which is absent finds a correlate in 
organizational constraints. 
It is in this way that both absences and constraints reduce the possible number of 
states a system is able to be in. However, Deacon delimits that absences and constraints 
express properties that are only fundamental to life: “Although irrelevant when it comes to 
inanimate things, [absence] is a defining property of life and mind” (Deacon 2012: 547). 
One of the core problems of Deacon’s theory is to explain how absences come to be 
relevant. Thus, one of the key assumptions that needs to be proved is that “ententional 
properties [are] constructible from (and thus emergent from) relationships among non-
ententional properties” (Deacon 2012:64). In order to take this assumption as a true premise 
of Deacon’s argument, one needs to explain the relationships between non-ententional 
properties and ententional ones. 
In the first place, to prove that ententional properties are constructible from non-
ententional ones, the difference between them has to be stated as not merely a matter of 
degree, and accordingly,  Deacon claims that “[t]here is no point where ententional 
dynamics just fades away smoothly into thermodynamics. Minds are not just made of 
minds of simpler form made of minds of yet simpler form” (Deacon 2012: 139). 
Underlying this statement there is the positing of a threshold between the non-living and 
the living realms that is only crossed with the rising of entention, for “it’s not just mind that 
requires to come to a scientific understanding of end-directed forms of causality; it’s life 
itself” (Deacon 2012: 22, emphasis added). And since we have accepted that life is 
coextensive with semiosis, the rise of entention is necessary for the existence of semiosis 
(and Deacon’s project of a scientifically rigorous biosemiotic theory seems an attainable 
goal). 
So far, we have seen that entention can explain teleology, although we haven’t show 
exactly in which way. The main problem we are facing is that the teleological features 
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borne by a system that exhibits ententional properties are not to be found solely in the parts 
which constitute the system in question, but only in the system taken as a whole. To solve 
this mereological problem, Deacon establishes a distinction between reducibility and 
decomposability. Reducibility refers only to the possibility of identifying constituent parts 
of a (complex) phenomenon and to study them as distinct from the whole they constitute, 
on the other hand, decomposability calls for the further identification in the parts of the 
properties borne by the whole (Deacon 2012: 85). On this basis, Deacon claims that “while 
ententional phenomena are dependent on physical substrate relationships, they are not 
decomposable to them, only to lower-order ententional phenomena. This is because 
although ententional phenomena are necessarily physical, their proper parts are not physical 
parts”. The last section of this claim calls for a small clarification. Ententional phenomena 
are not decomposable to physical substrate relationships because ententionality is foremost 
an immaterial (i.e. relational) feature (Deacon 2012: 40-41). As long as it is a consequence 
of organization, ententionality refers to the very directedness of a system’s organization, 
and as a result, even if it is an intrinsic feature, it comes into being as suprasubjective, i.e. 
as over and above both the system’s physical subjectivity (in Deely’s sense of the term, cf. 
Deely 2009:30) and that of thing which is represented as the pursued aim.  
To summarize what we have said up to here, ententionality stresses the properties 
often referred to as teleological that articulate life processes. It aims to characterize such 
teleological properties as intrinsic to the organization proper to life processes by means of 
considering the explanatory powers of absences and constraints. Accordingly, the puzzle of 
how entention and its implicit teleology can emerge is solved by Deacon’s theory of 
emergent dynamics (Deacon 2012: 549). The main argument that the theory is supporting is 
that ententionality is a consequence of organizational dynamics within a system — or 
within an organism. Deacon proposes three levels of organizational dynamics: 
homeodynamics, morphodynamics and teleodynamics. These three types of organizational 
dynamics make the distinctions between the ways in which mere tendencies produce 
regularities; regularities beget self-organization; and self-organization becomes eventually 
reproducible and end-directed (Deacon 2012: 541).  
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1.4. Emergent Dynamics 
 
Before introducing the nested levels of organizational dynamics, the relation between 
ententionality and entropy must be briefly examined. The form of causality proper to 
ententional phenomena is qualitatively opposed not only to physical causality but also to 
the second law of thermodynamics (at the level of the internal organization of a system). To 
put it simply, the second law of thermodynamics states that entropy of an isolated system 
increases together with the system's change towards equilibrium. Equilibrium here is taken 
to mean a state, in which “any future change is as likely to occur in one direction as the 
other, and over time directional changes will tend to cancel out, resulting in no net change 
overall” (Deacon 2012: 108). In another words, there is a natural tendency to disorder, as 
disorder means a more equal, less restricted distribution of the elements within a system. 
Thus, the rising of entropy results in homogeneity, which leads to the impossibility of 
semiosis to occur. 
The fact that ententional phenomena and living processes seem to violate this 
tendency was acknowledged among others by F. S. Rothschild in 1962, in his article “Laws 
of Symbolic Mediation in the Dynamics of Self and Personality”. The importance of this 
article is that it was the first in using the term biosemiotics (Kull 1999). In his article, 
Rothschild states that life “through its intentionality transcend[s] matter. In the latter, 
entropy, the principle of death dominates” (Rothschild 1962: 778). The difference between 
lifeless matter and the living organisms was for Rothschild a matter of the intentionality 
expressed by the organisms. Indeed, according to him, it is via intentionality that an 
organism can establish itself as a proper subject, and can keep itself from dying, and this 
principle was formulated by him as “the first biosemiotic rule” (Rothschild 1962: 779). 
While it is difficult to assert if Rothschild’s usage of intentionality was identical to the 
sense we are giving to it, it seems clear that, at least in one sense, his usage is compatible to 
that of Deacon’s ententionality; namely that intentionality as end-directedness is a feature 
of life, not solely of the mental. On the other hand, the relation between intentionality and 
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self posited by Rothschild is as well reminiscent of some of Deacon’s claims. But it is 
important to say that, within the whole of biosemiotics as the contemporary field of 
research we now know, the existence of a self has been seen as a main feature of life and, 
accordingly one of the most important things to explain from a biosemiotic perspective (cf. 
Kull et al. 2009). 
The notion of self is actually crucial for the emergence of ententionality. Organisms 
must somehow overcome entropy; in order to do it they must be able to avoid the general 
universal tendency to decay and disorder. Regarding this, Deacon writes:  
[a] boundary that distinguishes inside and outside is almost synonymous with the 
self/other distinction both functionally and metaphorically. […] The cell membrane 
is a boundary distinguishing a continuously maintained self-similar milieu inside 
from a varying and unconstrained outside world. Though neither impermeable nor 
inert, its role is vested in what cannot happen as a result. The constraint on 
molecular movements and interactions that containment provides is a necessary 
constitutive factor in all living systems. (Deacon 2012: 296)  
The delimitation of this contained self is a necessary condition for entention to emerge. Let 
us now look at how this self and its containment become possible by examining Deacon’s 
nested level of organizational dynamics. 
 
 
1.4.1. Homeodynamics 
 
Homeodynamics refers to the general tendency exhibited by any given system of increasing 
its entropy due to spontaneous changes (Deacon 2012: 550). Accordingly, the rising 
entropy of a system corresponds with a decrease of the constraints of the system (Deacon 
2012: 228). The key point in understanding homeodynamics is the relation between two 
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types of changes in the state of a system: orthograde and contragrade changes. These two 
types of changes are recurrent throughout all levels of organization, and in fact, each level 
of organizational dynamics has its own orthograde tendencies: “Each of these transitions 
[from one level of organization to another, e.g. from homeodynamics to morphodynamics] 
is characterized by the development of an orthograde disposition that is contrary to what 
preceded and gave rise to it” (Deacon 2012: 319). 
Orthograde changes are those changes that do not need extrinsic influences to 
happen, they respond to the natural spontaneous tendency to change without any imposed 
constraints directing them. These orthograde changes might interact with each other, and 
they might be in conflict between them, as Deacon states. In fact, the contrast arising from 
two contrary orthograde changes might result in contragrade changes. Contragrade changes, 
however, must be extrinsically imposed into a system, and they run against the “natural” 
orthograde tendency, although they are somewhat a product of them; indeed if two 
orthograde tendencies are in conflict this means that there are two elements being perturbed 
by external influences (i.e. contragrade changes), however the perturbation is a result of 
natural tendencies (i.e. orthograde changes). But, even if contragrade changes are the result 
of different orthograde changes, contragrade dynamics at the lower levels might produce 
orthograde dynamics at the higher levels (Deacon 2012: 225). Thus orthograde and 
contragrade changes are in fact a way to explain the microdynamics of the rising of 
entropy. At the same time, the interaction of contragrade and orthograde changes can lead 
to the appearance of constraints, and thus homeodynamics can produce orthograde 
tendencies that are nevertheless products of entropy’s microdynamics. 
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1.4.2. Morphodynamics 
 
Morphodynamics goes on the opposite way of homeodynamics; it creates constraints and 
organizations, with the addition of preserving them even without the extrinsic influences 
that led to the creation of such constraints and organizations in the first place (Deacon 
2012: 237). This work is mainly realized by the interaction of orthograde and contragrade 
dynamics; at a micro-level the dynamicity of the system is orthograde in nature, but its 
amplification at the macro-level exhibit contragrade tendencies. This kind of systems are 
open systems, and as such it is the flow of energy from without and into the system what 
causes the regularities of contragrade changes at the macro level that result in 
morphodynamicity or what is commonly known as self-organization (although there is no 
proper self in these systems; the self here is merely an emergent property of the system, but 
not a causal factor in its behavior, cf. Deacon 2012: 244). By means of energy flows, the 
constraints begotten by contragrade dynamics become constraints that get “inherited from 
past states of the system, which recurrently compound to further constrain the future 
behaviors of its component interactions” (Deacon 2012: 261). An important thing to remind 
is that morphodynamic tendencies of higher order suppose its own orthograde tendencies; a 
sort of natural direction of change within the spectrum of morphodynamic organization. 
 
 
1.4.3. Teleodynamics 
 
Finally, teleodynamics amounts to proper end-directedness, but does so only inasmuch as it 
is oriented to self-maintenance by actively using extrinsic conditions as means of 
preservation (Deacon 2012: 270). As a result, teleodynamics links the intrinsic properties of 
a system, such as its constraints, to the extrinsic conditions that help to preserve the 
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system’s organization. In this way, the organization of a system amounts to the end-
directedness it can ultimately exhibit, causing the seeming reversal of physical causality 
within the realm of life (Deacon 2012: 140-141). Deacon claims, however, that even if “the 
threshold zone between life and non-life corresponds to the fundamental boundary between 
teleodynamic processes and the simpler regimes of morphodynamic and thermodynamic 
processes [ – ] this does not necessarily mean that the origin of life is the only threshold 
leading to teleodynamics, or that only life can be teleodynamic” (Deacon 2012: 271). To 
put it as simple as possible: teleodynamics is an emergent property of the interaction of 
morphodynamic processes; morphodynamics create constraints and preserve them into 
future states of the system; the recursive morphodynamic processes give rise to orthograde 
tendencies that are a consequence of their own organization. This is basically what 
teleodynamics consist in: “it is a consequence-organized dynamic that is its own 
consequence” (Deacon 2012: 275, emphasis in the original). 
The work of constraints and the role they play in orthograde changes at each level is 
decisive for the emergence of this organizational dynamics. On the one hand, orthograde 
tendencies throughout the three level go from eliminating constraints (in homeodynamics) 
to amplification of constraints (in morphodynamics) to preservation of constraints (in 
teleodynamics) (Deacon 2012: 324). The orthograde tendencies resulting from 
teleodynamics are exemplified by what Deacon calls an autogen (Deacon 2012: 307, 319). 
An autogen is defined by him as: “A self-generating system at the phase transition between 
morphodynamics and teleodynamics; any form of self-generating, self-repairing, self-
replicating system that is constituted by reciprocal morphodynamic processes” (Deacon 
2012: 548). 
The novelty in autogen dynamics is its capacity to interpret. Autogen dynamics 
bounds the system to its extrinsic conditions because “autogenic organization only exists 
with respect to a relevant supportive environment” (Deacon 2012: 310). However, systems 
can become more fitted to their environments. In order to do so, they need to actively use 
environmental conditions for their own self-preservation. To be able to do so, means to 
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interpret; to determine what is the information carried by processes in the environment. 
This type of organization can thus enable entention to emerge. 
 
 
1.5. Two corollaries 
 
Ententionality is mainly an emergent property of systems exhibiting teleodynamic 
organization. At the core of teleodynamic organization we found organization regulated by 
constraints, and ententionality is primarily regulated by absentials. The intrinsic teleology 
of systems emerges as combination of the interplay between absences and constraints. The 
self-preservation of a system depends on the identification in the environment of given 
elements that can help the aforementioned self-preservation. If this is true, ententionality 
presupposes the existence of a pertinence principle by means of which the external 
environment of a system is classified
7
. The previous suggestion that teleology could be 
characterized as assignment of values should be understood in this way. Deacon 
acknowledges pertinence or relevance as an important factor in self-generation, but he does 
not treat it as a technical term. 
The pertinence principle proposed here would yield to the existence of a system of 
classification inherent to ententional activity, but it is of the foremost importance to 
highlight that the existence of a classification system, at this stage, does not imply 
consciousness, although the actual classification derived from such classification system 
would not be merely a mechanical process — it would only be a consequence of 
teleodynamic organization (cf. Deacon 2012: 26, 265, 323), and as such it would rather 
amount to the prefiguration of a functional circle, and later to the constitution of umwelts 
(cf. Kull 2015; Deacon 2012: 289–290). From Deacon’s perspective, the pertinence 
                                                          
7
 I take the idea of a pertinence principle articulating the classification system by means of which an organism 
cognizes its environment from Prieto’s Pertinence et pratique: essai de sémiologie (1975).  
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principle is dependent upon autocatalysis and morphodynamics, which lead to autogenesis, 
generation of the self in a very primitive sense (cf. Deacon 2012: 323). In another words, 
those levels of organization are what enables the existence of the pertinence principle by 
structuring the relationships among the parts of a system.  
To claim that a system which exhibits teleodynamic organization would classify its 
environment by means of a pertinence principle, which seems to be ultimately suggested by 
autogenesis and precisely the nested levels of organizational dynamics, brings along two 
corollaries: 
(i) It supposes that the system might be able to recognize differences. Differences can 
be recognized if the system is able to recognize features (or feature-like aspects) in 
the elements present on the system’s extrinsic conditions. Recognition of features 
entails that some features can be recognizable while others cannot. The features that 
can be recognized will become pertinent features if and only if these features are 
correlated with the specific goal that can be achieved by means of the element 
bearing such features (Prieto 1994). Thus, there might be other elements in the 
system’s extrinsic conditions that do not bear these features, i.e. there might be 
other elements that bear non-pertinent features, and as such those elements are 
either not recognized at all, or they simply do not exist within the system’s 
recognition capacities. We believe this mechanism of classification is ultimately 
suggested by Deacon’s notion of constraints, for they delimit the realizable states of 
a system. At the level of organisms, it would suppose that constraints are imposed 
directly on the pertinence principle that enables umwelt formation. 
(ii) The pertinence principle that is actualized in a classification system is able to beget 
a habit (indeed this is already suggested by autogen dynamics, see Deacon 2012: 
443). The problem here is the relationship between classification systems and 
choice. In order to choose, two complementary classes should be established. The 
reiteration of classifications begets habits. The seeming paradox entailed by this is 
that logical incompatibility (Kull 2015) produces regularity, and thus compatibility, 
by means of the development of semiosis. The formation of habits reinforces the 
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semiosic properties of the classification process, for there is a representation of the 
end to which classification is oriented embedded in the habituation process itself 
(Deacon 2012: 27). Let us explain this idea better: It is by means of the actualization 
of the pertinence principle that incompatibilities in the extrinsic conditions of a 
system get habituated into the system. At the level of organisms, however, they still 
remain as incompatible for the teleonomical sustainability of an organism. This is in 
a way a reformulation of teleodynamic organization and the fact that it is recursive 
and reproducible.  
These two corollaries will be the main axis of our analysis, but before proceeding, it is 
necessary to examine them in light of more traditional biosemiotic approaches. 
Our first corollary basically amounts to the fact that ententionality supposes the 
recognition of differences. Now, we would like first to present some arguments supporting 
the entwining we made of constraints and pertinence principle. Hoffmeyer has already 
stressed that one of the key efforts of the analysis put forward by Incomplete Nature is 
precisely to try to solve the problem of the emergence of mind by shifting “the focus from 
“matter” as such to “constraints in matter”” (Hoffmeyer 2015: 60). As we mentioned 
before, the notion of constraint is closely related to both ententionality and absential 
features. To this respect Logan (2012) claims: “Constraints […] prevent certain things from 
happening […]”, however, they do not “causally determine things” even though they 
“reduce the number of possibilities”” (Logan 2012: 293). By reducing the number of 
possibilities, constraints influence organization, and as such they have an impact in shaping 
teleology, as Barrett (2015) has pointed out: “the causal power of organization is due to the 
fact that organization is not something added, but something taken away: the distinctive 
organization of a process is an expression of its inherent constraints” (Barrett 2015: 38). 
This is in accordance with the claim we made in (i), i.e. constraints do have an influence in 
the pertinence principle by means of which umwelten are formed. As such, constraints are 
directly related to the recognition of differences, for recognition, or the possibility of 
recognition, is intrinsic to the system’s organization.  
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At the same time, the first corollary presents the Prietonian definition of pertinence 
with which we will be working over the next chapters. Pertinence refers to the correlation 
between a class of elements and a class of goals that can be achieved by using such 
elements. If two objects can be recognized as being equivalent, this would mean that they 
can be use to achieve the same goal. It is because of the fact that these two objects stand in 
an analogous relation with the goal that can be achieved by means of them, that the features 
they both bear can be regarded as pertinent features (cf. Prieto 1994). 
 
 
1.6. Semiotic Freedom 
 
The second corollary can be summarized by simply stating that the recognition of 
differences begets habits. Regarding this point, it is worth noticing that Hoffmeyer has 
referred to these habitual processes as semethic interactions (2012: 108). Semethic 
interactions are defined as habitual processes in the organism’s environment that can be 
recognized by the organism as possessing a specific value (Hoffmeyer 2012: 108). Thus, 
semethic interactions might work on the basis of a similar mechanism as the one described 
in (i), inasmuch as they are based on recognition of processes correlated with a specific 
aim. What Hoffmeyer is ultimately trying to emphasize with this notion is that knowledge, 
in a biological sense, is ruled by semiotic dynamics. The concept of semiotic dynamics is 
the pathway to what Hoffmeyer calls evolutionary intentionality (Hoffmeyer 2012: 112). 
The problem is this: semiotic dynamicity involves a certain amount of semiotic freedom 
(just as in Deacon’s autogenesis and teleodynamics), semiotic freedom should be capable to 
enable growth and development by means of an increase in the options that are available 
for an organism when interacting with its environment. Evolutionary intentionality aims to 
give account of how semiotic freedom increases across organisms. 
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Hoffmeyer drifts apart from Deacon only inasmuch as he does not make a 
terminological distinction between entention and intention, however, they are both looking 
at the same problems. Hoffmeyer’s semiotic freedom is somewhat related to Deacon’s 
teleodynamics, for it is only by means of teleodynamics that proper agency, and self, can 
emerge (cf. Deacon 2012: 275), and thus, teleodynamics seems to be necessary condition 
for semiotic freedom which in turn would be regarded as proper ententional phenomena, in 
the sense that both are inherently related to a telos. 
 
 
1.7. The problem of choice 
 
Rodríguez Higuera (2016a: 103) has suggested that teleodynamics can be understood as 
different from teleonomy only inasmuch as the former brings agency into the picture: 
“teleodynamics is outcome-oriented action with a certain amount of choice” (Rodríguez 
Higuera 2016a: 103). 
This “amount of choice” has been identified by Kull (2015) at the core of meaning-
making. Kull’s contribution in this respect is the aforementioned notion of logical 
incompatibility and the role it plays in semiosis. Logical incompatibility refers to the 
impossibility of executing two contradictory and simultaneous operations. Simultaneity is 
the key point. The possibility to choose presupposes a multiplicity of options and a logical 
conflict among them. There are different options only if they cannot be simultaneously 
chosen (Kull 2015). However, one can ask how are these options determined?  
The existence of options thus presupposes the recognition of differences and the 
existence of classification systems. Kull exemplifies a logical conflict by presenting two 
operations: (Operation 1) IF G THEN return and (Operation 2) IF G THEN go straight, do 
not return (Kull 2015: 618). Taken simultaneously they posit a logical conflict, they cannot 
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be made simultaneously. We would like to argue that within semiosis the operations can be 
seen as classes of actions, i.e. as types. The element in the protasis (i.e. G) should 
necessarily point to a class of elements, while the apodosis should involve two mutually 
exclusive classes of response to the element in the protasis. We would like to claim that the 
relation of exclusion among the classes in the apodosis presupposes the relation of 
exclusion among the two classes of operations (1 and 2). The fact of there being two 
mutually exclusive classes of action that a system can execute in facing one and the same 
element presupposes a classification system in which the two classes of actions are 
conceived as incompatible, and the element that elicits them is a correlate of these two 
classes. The main point here is that in order to assign value to elements in the environment, 
a system needs to operate with at least two mutually exclusive classes; this is ultimately a 
consequence of the recognition of features in (i). 
The problem of choice brings us back to Deacon’s notion of absential features: it is 
possible to interpret absential features as determining, or influencing at least, the range of 
options that can be taken by a given organism, but furthermore, they seem to be important 
factors in determining the telos with respect to which such organism is organized (Deacon 
2012: 24). Absential features, then, amount for a negative definition of teleology: it is not 
that water can be poured into a glass, rather it is the glass that misses the water; but only 
inasmuch as there is an option of pouring water into it; which makes the absence a real 
feature of the glass.  
In the next chapter, we will argue that Prieto’s theory can be interpreted as a means 
to further explore the relations between entention, recognized features and end-directed 
actions. Our main concern will be to develop Prieto’s theory beyond its anthroposemiotic 
stance and try to conceptualize it as general model of semiosis. We will show in which 
sense Deacon’s theory is useful for achieving this goal.  
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2. Pertinence 
 
At the end of the previous chapter we suggested that teleodynamic organization implies the 
existence of a pertinence principle. Given that teleodynamics amounts to end-directedness, 
there must be something which determines the recognition of specific instances of the end 
to which a system, or a process, is directed. Under Deacon’s approach this work is carried 
out by constraints as correlated with the end in respect to which a system is organized. Yet, 
both teleodynamics and its inherent constraints support the idea that ententional properties 
enable a system to make distinctions upon extrinsic factors, and it is in this way that 
entention seems to imply a pertinence principle by means of which the specific instances of 
the end toward which a system is directed are recognized by the system. Thus, we pointed 
out two corollaries that will serve as the main axis of our proposal, namely (i) that 
ententionality supposes the recognition of differences, and (ii) that such recognition 
ultimately begets habits. 
In order to further explain these formulations we need to present Prieto’s main ideas 
on cognition, and this task will require us to drift away momentarily from Deacon’s 
minimal model and go up to anthroposemiosic phenomena. We will try to explain in which 
sense the anthroposemiosic claims we draw from Prieto’s theory are related to 
ententionality as a more general semiosic phenomenon. 
 
 
2.1. Form and Substance 
 
The first analytic categories we need to introduce for making sense of Prieto’s 
theory and how it can become a general model of semiosis aided by Deacon’s ideas are 
those of form and substance. Prieto’s thinking is deeply rooted on structural and functional 
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linguistics. Saussure stressed the fact that linguistics as a science is dealing with nothing 
more than sign systems, and as such, linguistics should be included in the domain of a 
broader science called semiology. Let us pass this issue without further commentaries, it is 
not of immediate interest now to discuss the problems of naming our discipline, it suffices 
to say that we adhere to Deely’s position of characterizing semiology as a part of semiotics. 
We will use semiology however, for referring to the structural approach within our 
discipline. 
Anyhow, structural linguistics, from Hjelmslev to Saussure, deals with the problem 
of sign and tries to determine what a sign is departing from a linguistic point of view, and 
as such, dealing mainly with linguistic signs. This is the reason why the Saussurean (and 
structural) sign model is two-faced, because it is designed for being used in linguistic 
analysis. Langue
8
, following Saussure, is a system wherein there exists nothing more than 
differences, and each element of the system exists only as a terminus of a relationship with 
another element. The system, langue, does not need to take into account whatever it is that 
a sign stands for, it needs only to grasp the relations between that sign and the other signs in 
the system (Saussure 2003: 136). This fact was stressed by Hjelmslev in a more definitive 
way (Hjelmslev 1971).  
This particular view of langue is only possible because the structural tradition 
assumes that langue is a form, not a substance (and probably no other linguistic school of 
thought would disagree on this fact). According to Saussure, the fact that langue is a form 
results in the fact that its most distinctive function is to serve as medium between an 
acoustic substance, a continuum of sound, and a somewhat psychic substance, a continuum 
of thought (Saussure 2003: 137). Langue as form organizes those substances bringing them 
into certain relations that lead to the establishment of linguistic unities. In this view, 
substance is unformed form, but is always able to be constituted as form. 
Hjelmslev on the other hand, did not agree completely with Saussure’s view. 
According to Hjelmslev, there is no reason to think that substance, as a non-differentiated 
                                                          
8
 The French term langue will be used in the sense of “the system of language”, or “language structure”, we 
prefer this term to the English “language”, which is ambiguous.  
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continuum, precedes form. In order to have form, he claims, substance is not really 
necessary. But one must be careful when treating this problem. For, in fact, Hjelmslev’s 
notion of substance is rather different from that of Saussure’s! 
In his Prolegomena, Hjelmslev claims that the idea that a langue is a sign system is 
not completely right. A langue, in Hjelmslev’s view is a system of figures which can be 
combined to form signs. For its function, a langue is a sign system, but in its own 
constitution it is a system of figures that can be combined into signs. At the level of figures, 
the semiotic relation is not between expression and content, or signifier and signified, but 
rather it is established between the figures as form and the portion of substance that lies 
underneath them (Hjelmslev 1971: 86). A phoneme, as long as it is a linguistic entity (an 
entity of langue), is form, but it “stands for” some portion of substance, i.e. its acoustic 
dimension
9
. In the expression plane of a langue, the relations between the acoustic 
substance and its form correlate, i.e. a phoneme is a unilateral dependency in which the 
acoustic sound presupposes the phoneme but the phoneme does not presuppose the acoustic 
sound: thus substance depends on form
10
. This holds as well for the content plane. 
Let us explain this better. What Hejlmslev is aiming to do in his Prolegomena is to 
outline a theory of linguistics, namely glossematics. The formal apparatus he introduces is 
designed as a scientific tool that can deal with language without any kind of metaphysical 
assumptions. Thus, the Hjelmslevian project tries to be an algebraic approach to language 
analysis; it focuses solely on the relations between elements of the system without dealing 
with the “real” nature of the terminus of such relations. The analysis, thus, becomes most 
than anything else, a calculus of combinations. These combinations constitute what 
Hjelmslev calls a linguistic scheme. The scheme, however only needs to be potentially 
manifestable in a substance, it does not need to be actually manifested. It is in this sense 
that form does not depend on substance and it does not presuppose substance, but substance 
always presupposes a given form. 
                                                          
9
 This is explicitly stated in the Prolegomena (1971: 86).  
10
 As Miguel Ariza (2008, 2009) has shown, the concept of “presupposition” is central to the whole of 
Hjelmslev’s semiotic theory.  
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On this basis, it is easy to see that form and substance are actually relative terms. 
According to Hjelmslev:  
La « forme » dans [un] sens général, se définit comme l’ensemble total, mais 
exclusive, des marques qui, selon l’axiomatique choisie, sont constitutive des 
définitions Tout ce qui n’est pas compris dans une telle « forme », mais qui de toute 
évidence appartiendrait à une description exhaustive de l’objet étudié, este relégué à 
une autre hiérarchie qui par rapport à la « forme » joue le rôle de « substance ». 
(Hjelmslev 1954 : 172)
11
 
Substance always implies a certain degree of “formedness”, and thus what appears as 
substance at one level might function as form at another level (Hjelmslev 1954). Substance 
in itself, as prior to any degree of formedness, is what Hjelmslev calls purport or matter 
(Hjelmslev 1954: 174). 
For Prieto, the notion of substance is again different. His understanding of 
substance is in a way more similar to Saussure’s. Against Hjelmslev, Prieto does not mind 
to give substance an ontological status; in fact Prieto treats substance in a way that is closer 
of Hjelmslev’s notion of matter; that is substance without any degree of formedness. 
Substance, then, constitutes the very material dimension of an object. The material, 
acoustic, dimension of a sound is its dimension of substance, and its phonological features 
are form. On this basis it is possible to generalize Prieto’s notion of substance as the 
material reality of any given object, i.e. as the properties that an object has in its own being. 
So, according to Prieto substance will be closer to the conception of a mind independent 
reality (cf. Fadda 2012: 29 n10).  
To which extent this suggestion is right is something that we will determine in the 
next sections. In order to properly explain Prieto’s shift on the notion of substance we need 
to introduce his whole semiotic model. For now, let us say that this position is possible 
                                                          
11
 “The “form”, in [a] general sense is defined as the total set, although exclusive, of marks that, according to 
the chosen axiomatic, are constitutive of definitions. Everything that is not comprehended in such “form”, but 
which is evidently part of an exhaustive definition of the studied object, is relegated to another hierarchy in 
which as relative to “form” it plays the role of “substance”.” (Translation by the author.) 
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because of a materialist approach in Prieto’s way of thinking. A main challenge for 
articulating Prieto and Deacon, and for the development of Prieto’s model as a general 
model of semiosis, is to probe that this materialist approach can be seen as semiotic 
realism. For now, we have to introduce the semiotic model present in Prieto’s theory. 
 
 
2.2. Sign 
 
The sign for Prieto is always a bi-facial entity that puts two planes, or two universes of 
discourse, borrowing the term from set theory, into a correlation such that any pertinent 
change in one plane must lead to an analogous pertinent change in the other (Prieto 1975: 
18). This is very much in line with Hjelmslev definition of semiotic structure (or simply 
semiotic in Hjelmslev’s terminology, cf. Hjelmslev 1971, Fadda 2003). The planes that a 
sign correlates are called by Prieto, following Hjemslev, the expression plane and the 
content plane or the signifier plane and the signified plane. 
It is possible to conceive a typology of signs implicitly formulated throughout 
Prieto’s works. The starting point is the concept of indice12. An indice is a perceptible fact 
that indicates a non perceptible fact, and does so by correlating two classes pertaining each 
of them to two different planes. The perceptible fact belongs to the indicator plane, and the 
non perceptible fact to the indicated plane. An indication can be given any time that we 
recognize a perceptible fact as the member of a specific class of facts in the indicator plane, 
and on this basis we can derive the membership of a non perceptible fact to a specific class 
of non perceptible facts in the indicated plane (Prieto 1975: 19). Each of these classes are in 
a relation such that a pertinent change in one of the members of the specific classes would 
entail a pertinent change in the membership of the other (Prieto 1975: 19), i.e. by changing 
                                                          
12
 We will keep the French word indice as a means to stress the difference between Prieto’s conceptualization 
of indication as a type of sign and the Peircean index. Throughout the exposition it will be clear that these two 
are different notions. 
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the indice in the indicator plane and making it belong to a different class, the class to which 
the indicated fact belongs will also change, and thus the indice would provide a different 
indication. This is the basic semiosic mechanism upon which the whole of Prieto’s theory is 
constructed; by complicating this basic model we will arrive to more complex forms of 
semiosis. 
Now, among indices Prieto distinguishes three kinds: (a) spontaneous indices, e.g. 
the correlation between the color of the sky at night and the weather of the next day; (b) 
falsely spontaneous indices, e.g. the imitation of the noise of rain done by someone in order 
to deceit someone else about the weather outside a house; and (c) intentional indices, e.g. 
saying “give it to me” in order to get a book, or anything else, from someone. This last 
class of indices can be what Prieto calls a signal (Prieto 1966: 15–27; 1975: 15–16). 
According to Prieto, a signal is an indice explicitly produced to cause a certain 
effect on the receiver of the signal (Prieto 1975: 24, so it is different from Sebeok’s notion 
of signal, for instance). This effect is determined by the signal as long as the signal is a part 
of a larger entity called seme. A seme will be defined by Prieto as the union of a signal and 
a sense (Prieto 1975: 29). Signals function on the basis of the indication mechanism: a 
perceptible fact (the signal) indicates a non-perceptible one (its sense). The major 
difference between a mere indice and a signal is that the signal is part of a seme that 
pertains to a proper semiotic structure, as long as the seme is a communicational entity. The 
two planes that the seme will bring together are a signifier plane (signal) and a signified 
plane (sense). The semiotic structure to which the seme belongs will determine the 
correlations between classes of signals and classes of senses that can be conveyed by the 
signals by means of that particular semiotic structure (Prieto 1975: 27, 39). The use of 
semes will determine what Prieto calls, following Buyssens, a semic act, or simply a 
communication act. 
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The main difference between indices and semes is thus the intention with which 
they are produced
13
. Communication for Prieto is always intentional; i.e. it has an intrinsic 
purpose – to influence the receptor of the seme. Semiosis, however, goes beyond this limit, 
and it is because of this fact that a distinction between mere indications and proper 
communicational signs should be established (a distinction that ultimately resulted in the 
establishing of two semiologies, a semiology of communication consecrated to the study of 
signals and semes, and a semiology of signification, consecrated to the study of every other 
semiotic phenomena (e.g. all the types of indices) cf. Prieto 1977: 181–202).  
We should note that the main problem for Prieto is not the intention itself, but the 
mechanism underlying any semiosic event (Prieto 1977: 185). It is important to keep in 
mind then that the exact same mechanism functioning for an indication (which is not 
intentional) is to be found at the core of a semic act (which is intentional). Thus, intention 
plays a role only at the description level, by means of intention we can distinguish at the 
level of description between indication and communication. At an ontological level, 
however, they are both semiosic processes and the same rules should apply. Thus the basic 
semiosic mechanism of indication is to be found in semic acts.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13 It could be said that the distinction between indices and signals reminds the scholastic distinction between 
natural signs and conventional signs. To make this medieval analogy more dramatic, we could mention that 
Prieto (1975b: 186) sometimes would talk about conventional indices to refer to semiotic phenomena such as 
clothing (or fashion, following Barthes’ work (see Prieto 1977: 181–202)). This kind of indices would be 
somehow unintentional but they would have certain intentional properties in addition to their mere 
signification load. Thus, they could be an analogue of scholastic’s customary signs: they are more “natural” 
than ordinary conventional signals, but they are still conventional. 
 
45 
 
2.3. Semiosis 
 
The whole process of interpretation of the indice, and of the signal in the semic act, will be 
to recognize the pertainig of the indicated fact to a given class A, or to its complement. 
Briefly stated, the calculus implied by the process of interpretation of an indice is as 
follows: 
(1) If a perceptible fact belongs to a given class A, then a non perceptible fact will 
belong to either a given class A’ of non perceptible facts or to its complement, but 
not to both. 
Spelled out, the whole process would look like this: 
(2) (a)  An interpreter faces a given perceptible fact p that indicates a given non-
perceptible fact n. The identity of the non perceptible fact is unknown to the 
interpreter, i.e. the interpreter only knows there is a given unspecified n. 
(b)  The interpreter recognizes p as an element of class A of perceptible facts. 
(c)  On the basis of (b), the interpreter can recognize n under a certain identity, 
i.e. the interpreter specifies n via its membership to either class A’ of the non-
perceptible facts that p can indicate or to its complement. 
The basic calculus underlying the interpretation of signs in general according to Prieto is 
mainly stated in (2c). The main problem is to determine whether the non perceptible fact 
belongs to class A’ or to its complement. Let us go slowly. Class A’ of n’s implies a 
complementary class of no-n’s. The union, in the set theoretical sense of the word, between 
these two classes, A’ and its complement gives as result the universe of discourse that plays 
the role of the indicated plane. Now, if the interpretation of p consists in specifying the 
membership of n to class A’, or to its complement, this means that p indicates the whole 
indicated universe of discourse as a class of classes (Prieto 1966: 20). 
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The fact that p indicates the whole indicated universe of discourse is not trivial. By 
indicating the whole indicated universe of discourse as a class of classes, p “structures” 
such universe of discourse, and thus it distributes the whole range of possibilities taking 
place in that universe of discourse in at least two classes: A’ and its complement. Prieto 
says this clearly (emphasis added): 
L’indice se rapporte à l’ensemble de cet univers [the indicated universe of 
discourse], et indique ce qui n’est en définitive que sa division en deux classes 
complémentaires. […] Si nous appelons « structure » la division d’un tout en parties 
telles que la valeur de chacune dépend de son rapport avec les autres, nous pouvons 
dire que l’indice se rapporte à un univers de discours en y indiquant une 
structuration particulière. (Prieto 1966: 22)
14
 
To make things a bit more complicated, Prieto states that the class to which n belongs 
might be the logical sum of two or more classes (Prieto 1966: 20). To put it simply, the 
logical sum of two or more classes can be defined as a class consisting in all the elements 
that belong to any class that belong to a class of classes. So, if for instance we consider a 
universe of discourse that is a class of classes and that consists in classes X, Y and Z, the 
logical sum of those classes is the class to which all elements in X, Y and Z belong. Back to 
Prieto’s model, if p indicates the logical sum of two classes, then the classifications in the 
indicated universe of discourse must be more complex than just A’ and its complement: A’ 
must necessarily be as well a class of classes and, properly stated, n will belong to the 
logical sum of A’ or to the logical sum of its complement15. 
                                                          
14
 “The índice is related to this universe as a whole [the indicated universe of discourse] and it indicates that 
which is nothing more than its division in two complementary classes. […] If we call “structure” the division 
of a whole in parts such that the value of each depends of its relation to the others, we could say that the 
indice is related with a universe of discourse in which it indicates a particular structuration” (translation by 
the author). 
15
 When dealing with more complex semiotic phenomena, i.e. semic acts, Prieto states that the indicated class 
can be either the logical sum or the logical product. The logical product amounts very much to the intersection 
of the classes within a class. So if A’ is a class of classes, its logical product is the class containing the 
common elements of all the classes of A’. 
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Thus, when interpreting an indice we are facing a similar situation to that of a 
logical conflict. The main problem is that at the moment of interpretation, n cannot belong 
simultaneously to A’ and to its complement. 
This situation is not different in communication from the point of view of the 
receptor. When facing a signal, the receptor must determine which class of classes of senses 
is being indicated by the signal. This is a natural fact in communication as a process (in the 
Hjelmslevian sense of the word). However, in the dimension of system, things might be a 
bit different. From the system’s point of view, the signal does not structure the universe of 
discourse to which the sense belongs. The relation between indicator plane and indicated 
plane in a semiotic structure, i.e. expression and content, is different to the extent that the 
criterion for determining different classes of expression is that they can effectively 
distinguish classes of content, but the pertinence principle for distinguishing among classes 
of expression is provided by the structure (i.e. the classes and their relations) of the content 
plane. In any case, content structures expression in the system (although there exists, as 
Hjelmslev says solidarity between them; content provides the pertinence for the classes in 
expression, in this sense the former structures the latter), and expression structures content 
in the process. 
 
 
2.4. Cognition 
 
When hearing a sequence of sounds one is able to understand a given utterance and its 
meaning. This operation consists in recognizing the belonging of the indicated object, the 
non perceptible fact, to a specific class. Now, to recognize the object as an element of a 
specific class means to recognize that the object bears a feature, or a set of features, that 
constitutes the comprehension of the given class. This is a two headed operation. When one 
recognizes the object as bearing a feature that determines the comprehension of a class, that 
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object in turn becomes a member of the extension of that class. Furthermore, the object 
appears as being different from all the other objects that do not bear that feature. Thus the 
recognizing of a feature involves the recognizing of a difference, and thus of at least two 
complementary classes (Prieto 1975). 
It is necessary to go slowly again. The object as a member of a class, says Prieto, 
realizes a concept (Prieto 1994). This concept amounts to the comprehension of the class to 
which the object belongs. A cognitive act is effectuated every time that a subject, on the 
basis of a calculus of the features that an object must possess to realize a concept, 
recognizes that a specific object, hic et nunc, realizes a specific concept (Prieto 1975: 115), 
thus a communicative act is but a type of cognitive act. However, it is crucial to 
acknowledge that “the class logically precedes the concept” (Prieto 1994: 794), logically 
not temporally, this is an important remark to bear in mind. It is by recognizing that the 
members of a class bear the “same” features that those features can become pertinent 
features. Faced to a collection of objects, one can classify them according to the features 
they bear. To establish a criterion for determining which features are relevant is what 
enables classification. The criterion by means of which the objects are classified is not part 
of the classification, it only determines the classification, and this criterion is exactly the 
pertinence principle we have introduced before. However, logically the class of objects 
comes first; i.e. the class is a necessary condition for there to be a concept, and the concept 
is a sufficient condition for there to be a class (cf. Ariza 2012). 
This issue is directly related to the more important question of how can the features 
borne by the objects be recognized by a subject? On the basis of what can an object achieve 
its identity as a member of a class? Prieto writes:  
The perception of an object by a subject is always achieved through a concept, 
which can of course be either explicit or implicit, that is to say that the subject is not 
necessarily able to detail the features which constitute it. To perceive an object is, in 
other words, nothing but to recognize it as the realization of a concept and therefore 
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to recognize in it those features, and as a rule only those of its features, that 
constitute this concept. (Prieto 1994: 794) 
We encounter here the very same mechanism of indication that we introduced in the 
previous section. The object indicates the class to which it belongs via realizing a concept. 
The class of objects as cognizable objects correlates with class of objects as cognized, or to 
say it more precisely, there is a class of objects as substance correlated with a class of 
objects as form. However, at this level we are facing a system, and thus it is the concept’s 
universe of discourse, as n, what structures the object’s universe of discourse as p. Thus, in 
accordance with the Hjelmslevian view, form structures substance! However, this is not yet 
the whole picture. 
We need to introduce Prieto’s notion of aesthesis and his model of the cognitive act 
to properly characterize the relationship between form and substance. For Prieto, aesthesis 
very much amounts to “sensation”. It seems fair to make a rather long quote by Prieto, in 
order to clarify this problem. He writes:  
Une caractéristique qu’on reconnaît à un objet ne peut en effet se manifester que 
dans ce que nous appellerons l’aisthesis de la portion de la réalité qui constitue cet 
objet, c’est-à-dire dans l’ensemble des modifications physiologiques qu’elle [the 
characteristic] provoque dans les organes sensoriels du sujet. Or, c’est par la 
présence et par l’absence d’une même modification des organes sensoriels que se 
manifestent respectivement, dans l’aisthesis, les caractéristiques composant un 
couple des caractéristiques corrélatives, et par conséquent, d’un point de vue qui, 
nous l’admettons volontiers, peut être qualifié de « substantialiste », ce n’est pas 
n’importe laquelle des caractéristiques composant un tel couple qui en constitue le 
terme positif ou le terme négatif, celle qui se manifeste par l’absence de la 
modification des organes sensoriels dont la présence manifeste l’autre constituant 
bien entendu, de ce point de vue, le terme négatif. Nous verrons que d’autres 
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problèmes […] ne peuvent être traités convenablement que si on se place de ce 
point de vue « substantialiste ». (cf. Prieto 1975: 88)
16
 
The crucial part is that Prieto states that the presence or absence of a characteristic is not 
what constitutes the negative or the positive term of an opposition between two correlative, 
we could say binary, characteristics (e.g. voiceless versus voiced). What actually 
constitutes the positive or negative term (and thus what ultimately determines the presence 
or absence of a characteristic) is the presence or absence of a set of modifications in the 
sensorial organs of the subject, which is always a correlate of a material feature born by the 
object in its materiality, i.e. the object as ens realis, as long as the subject cognizes entia 
realia. In this way, substance for Prieto is closer to Hjelmslev’s notion of matter, as it 
points to non-formed substance, to matter as able to specify the cognitive faculties of the 
subject. The quote by Prieto states that substance is a portion of reality, for this to work, 
substance could not have any degree of formedness: it can only mean matter. We will go 
one step further; substance in the context of Prieto’s quotation can only be mind 
independent reality
17
. 
                                                          
16 “A characteristic that we recognize as borne by an object can only be manifested in what we will call the 
aesthesis of the portion of reality that such object constitutes, that is to say in the set of physiological 
modifications that it [the characteristic] provokes in the sensorial organs of the subject. It is by the presence 
and absence of the same modification of the sensorial organs that the characteristics composing a pair of 
correlative characteristics are respectively manifested in the aesthesis, and in consequence, from a point of 
view that, we admit it, can be qualified as “substantialist”, it is not  just any of the characteristics composing 
such a pair the one which constitutes the positive term or the negative term, from this point of view, the 
negative term is the one that gets manifested by the absence of the modification of the sensorial organs whose 
presence manifests the other constituent. We will see that other problems […] cannot be properly dealt with 
unless we place ourselves in this “substantialist” point of view.” (Translation by the author.) 
17
 The issue is actually a bit more complicated, and it could be argued that even by funding cognition in 
aesthesis, Prieto’s notion of substance is still the Hjelmselvian one. A possible argument defending this claim 
could be made on the basis of the notion of “universal feature” (“caractéristique universelle”, Prieto 1975: 
94). For Prieto, a universal feature is what defines a universe of discourse. For an object to be recognized as a 
cognizable portion of reality, it has to bear a universal feature, and on the basis of that universal feature a 
second feature, which is always but one of two correlative features (correlative features being defined as a 
pair of features in complementary distribution, i.e. presence vs absence, Prieto 1975: 86), is recognized to the 
object. This second feature will define the identity of the object, i.e. it will determine to which non universal 
class the object belongs. However, the object is no longer just matter (non-formed substance), as it has 
become in-formed substance, to some degree, by means of the universal feature. To this, one could reply that 
Prieto is taking an ontological stance, but I think this reply lets the problem only half resolved. In any case, I 
cannot offer a satisfying response to this issue and I should leave it for future work. For the purpose of this 
thesis, I will assume that Prieto’s notion of substance can be equated with mind independent reality because 
of Prieto’s ontological stance, without going any deeper into the problem. 
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This somewhat realist interpretation of Prieto’s ideas has been already suggested in 
a way by the critique Sémir Badir (2001) has made to Prieto. Badir (2001: 10) points 
precisely to how is it possible to recognize that a given object bears a given feature if it is 
the feature what makes the object recognizable in the first place. He notices that this way of 
proceeding forces Prieto to make a sort of ontological commitment to the invariability of 
substance (which is in conflict with the Hjelmslevian understanding of substance). Badir is 
right in claiming that Prieto is ontologically committed to substance, and this should be 
enough to see that substance has a different meaning in Prieto than in Hjelmslev. In Prieto’s 
theory, substance is not (or not only) “the variable in a manifestation”. And, as we have 
claimed, Prieto’s commitment to substance is mainly a consequence of his materialist 
orientation (cf. Prieto 1991: 23–29; Fadda 2012: 29, n. 10 ). This shifting in the notion of 
substance would not diminish the problems of the relation between semiology and 
linguistics that Badir identifies in Prieto’s thought, but it would certainly support Badir’s 
opinion that Prieto’s work is more oriented towards a syntax and semantics of the 
“cognitive constructions” (Badir 2001: 12). 
Indeed, by approaching Prieto’s model as a syntax and semantics of cognitive 
constructions (i.e. general semiotics), his usage of aesthesis as sensation would fall into 
intersubjectivity in the specific Deelyian sense of the term; an interaction between 
substances: the substance of the object and the substance of the subject, wherein the 
sensorial organs of the subject get specified by the substantial properties of the object. In 
this way the link between Prieto’s theory and the notion of cognitive intentionality we 
introduced at the very beginning of this work can be clearly seen. On the other hand, the 
need of Deacon’s teleodynamics as a fundamental piece of this linkage can also be 
appreciated. 
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2.5. Classification 
 
As we have seen, for Prieto knowledge is primarily classification (Prieto 1975: 81). To 
cognize a given object is to assign a given identity to the object in question, which means to 
recognize the object as a member of a specific class of objects (Prieto 1975: 81). This 
operation is grounded on the recognition of differences. These differences are correlated 
with the features present and recognizable (by a cognizing subject, or to put it more 
broadly, a system) in the very materiality of the objects of knowledge (Prieto 1975: 87).  
The notions of identity and difference play very different roles in Prieto’s model of 
cognition. For him, the identity of an object is dependent on the classes by means the object 
is cognized (Prieto 1975: 83). So, if two objects belong to the same class of objects, they 
are cognized under the same identity. This would render the objects “equivalent” from the 
point of view of knowledge. Approaching Deacon, we could formulate this in the following 
way: equivalence between cognizable objects depends on the semiotic structure by means 
of which the extrinsic conditions of a system are classified. 
Difference, however, does not depend on the semiotic structure, but on the objects 
themselves (Prieto 1975: 83), this is a consequence of the role of substance in aesthesis, as 
we saw at the end of the previous section. However, there is always a tension between the 
object as substance, and the object as form: if two objects are recognized as being different 
from each other, then the features that define the corresponding classes to which each of the 
objects belongs must be correlated to the material features of the object, because it the 
material features are responsible for the sensorial modifications in aisthesis. A recognized 
feature is not reducible to an epistemic dimension: it has an ontological correlate in the 
substance of the cognized object (Prieto 1975: 84, 85 n.11). This is way is possible to claim 
that substance for Prieto is mind independent reality. 
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The pertinence of a feature can only be given by a semiotic structure (Prieto 1975: 
111). In Prieto’s theory a semiotic structure is composed by classification systems. A word 
should be said about the relation between classification systems and semiotic structures. 
Classification systems are the backbone of semiotic structures, they need a semiotic 
structure because classification works on the basis of pertinence, and pertinence is provided 
by a semiotic structure. When classifying the sounds that constitute the expression plane of 
a langue the pertinence of the classification is given by the classes composing the content 
plane of a langue. There is no classification without pertinence, and “il n’y a pas de 
pertinence sans structure sémiotique”18 (Prieto 1975: 111). 
This is has an important impact on the typology of signs we introduced before, and 
it may rise a very powerful objection; it would seem that there is only one type of signs, 
and the difference between them is merely descriptive. This is in part true, if we assume 
that classification systems are always part of semiotic structures, and thus indices 
presuppose a semiotic structure.  
However, the complexity of the mechanism of indication when dealing with signals 
becomes then the only definite criteria of differentiation. It seems that to some extent the 
difference between indices and signals as part of semes, is not only that the former are 
unintentional, but that in semes there is a double pertinence in the content plane (see Prieto 
1977). This double pertinence on the content plane permits the signal to mean different 
things in different contexts, because signals have a sematic meaning (e.g. the semantic 
meaning of a word) on the first place, but they also have a noetic meaning (e.g. the 
pragmatic meaning of a word). The assumption here is that indications only have the latter. 
 
 
 
                                                          
18
 “There is no pertinence without a semiotic structure”. 
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2.6. The problem of Features 
 
Before proceeding, it is needed to state clearly what a feature is. As we saw what 
constitutes a feature is the presence or absence set of modifications in the sensorial organs 
at the aesthesis of a given portion of reality. Via feature recognition, classes are established. 
Features permit the identification of an object as realizing a concept. The class of objects 
that is the realization of a concept is correlated with the class of concepts realizable by the 
class of objects in virtue of pertinence. Now, let us say it clearly: pertinence is always 
defined in relation to a given practice (Prieto 1975, 1994). One of the definitions of class 
provided by Prieto explicitly states this: “A class is a set of objects all equivalent to one 
another in regard to a certain practice, inasmuch as they all are either equally efficient 
means to attain a given goal or equally attainable goals by using a given means” (Prieto 
1994: 794). This means, basically, that an object achieves an identity via its equivalence 
with other objects in regard to determined goal. 
 Before moving to how features are implicated in the relation of pertinence and 
practice, let us approach the problem of features in more detail. Prieto (1988) tried to define 
what a feature is in a rigorous manner. According to him there is a widespread assumption 
that a feature is always a unity, a single trait that distinguishes an object from other objects, 
yet, he claims, this naïve conception of what a feature is might be challenged. According to 
him, there are two recognizable aspects in every feature, an oppositional aspect and a 
contrastive aspect
19. A door for example can have as a feature to be 3m tall, Prieto’s 
notation for a feature in this context is: “(tallness) 3m”. The part in the parenthesis is the 
oppositional aspect of the feature, and the part outside the parenthesis is the contrastive 
aspect of the feature. The oppositional aspect of a feature is called by him a “dimension” 
(of the object that bears the feature). Now, different semiotic structures might have two 
oppositional aspects as dimensions of only one feature. When defining the phonological 
                                                          
19
 Prieto talks about these aspects as “elements” (Prieto 1988: 30). However, it seems to me that since features 
are not component objects, and thus, a phoneme for example is not a compound object, but a bundle of 
features (cf. Prieto 1977: 209, 213), it might be better to call “aspects” the contrastive and the oppositional 
properties of features.  
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opposition between two vowels in one language, e.g. /e/ and /o/ in Spanish, two phonetic 
features might count as only one phonological feature. In the Spanish, /e/ and /o/ have 
“(position of the tongue)” and “(position of the lips)” as only one pertinent feature, /e/ 
bearing the only pertinent feature “(position of the tongue) front” and “(position of the lips) 
non round”, and /o/ bearing “(position of the tongue) back” and “(position of the lips) 
round)”. Thus, in Spanish, according to Prieto, the degree of aperture (both vowels are mid 
vowels in Spanish), as a phonological feature, is a feature implied by the single pertinent 
feature “(position of the tongue)” and “(position of the lips)” (Prieto 1988: 27–29). In 
Estonian, for example, the situation would be different, since a mid frontal non rounded 
vowel, as /e/, would be opposed to a mid back non rounded vowel, i.e. the first sound in the 
Estonian word for ‘beer’. The notion of implicated features permits Prieto to bring forward 
a new theory of both phonotatics, and of syntax tout court, as the aforementioned critique 
of Badir goes. The more relevant aspect of this is that a dimension of an object, according 
to Prieto is an inherent feature of an object, i.e. a material feature (cf. Prieto 1988). Thus, 
features and the role they play in cognitive processes are to be defined by looking at 
substance, and the way substance can be apprehended previous to be in-formed. This 
affirms Prieto’s ontological view, at least to some extent. 
Accordingly, classes logically precede concepts, and this is crucial. To say that a 
class logically precedes the concept means nothing else than extension presupposes 
comprehension. In order to recognize something as a member of class, one should know 
what is it that can qualify the object as a member of the class. The features of set of features 
to be recognized in the object are presupposed by the recognition of the said object as a 
member of the class. This is, as noted before, still in line with a Hjelsmelvian view on the 
form-substance relations, however, from Prieto’s point of view the relation is ontological 
because substance manifests material features in the aesthesis, and this result in the 
overlapping, in Prieto’s theory of the Hjelmslevians notions of form and substance. On the 
other hand this way of reasoning appears to lead to a seeming paradox: for a class to have 
extension it needs to have comprehension, but comprehension is established on the basis of 
extension. We would claim that this is not so much a paradox as it is the positing of a 
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tension between form and substance. This tension, to formulate it in more suitable terms for 
this work, is a matter of constraints and absentials. 
Indeed, teleodynamics, as we saw, functions via constraints, because organization is 
dependent of constraints. The telos of a teleodynamic system is defined by absentials. But 
the absentials should afford the comprehension of the class to which the telos belongs, 
while constraints should provide the possibilities of recognizing instantions of such telos. If 
form is to be dependent on substance, i.e. if substance presupposes form, this should be 
only a consequence of embodied teleodynamics. 
Let us now move on to present the proper articulation between Prieto's and Deacon’s 
models. 
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3. Ententionality and Pertinence: The expanded model 
 
 
The relation of form with substance posits an apparent irresoluble tension. On the one hand, 
it seems that Prieto’s view of substance is very much similar to that of Hjelmslev. 
Substance depends on form because substance presupposes form. We arrived to this 
conclusion by applying the basic semiosic mechanism outlined by Prieto to his view on 
cognition. On the other hand, the proposal by Prieto determines that the features in virtue of 
which an object belongs to a specific class are to be found as manifested in the aesthesis of 
the portion of reality the said object constitutes. 
Thus, for Prieto, there is a cognitive trajectory that starts in aesthesis, and moves to 
perception. At the level of perception, the different modifications that objects imprint on 
the sensorial organs (in aesthesis) are grouped into classes in virtue of their being 
equivalent in respect to another class in another universe of discourse, and the classes of 
sensorial modifications extract their pertinence from this other universe of discourse. This 
other universe of discourse is the universe of discourse of concepts. The classes of sensorial 
modifications correspond to classes of concepts (figure 1). According to Prieto, a given 
class realizes a concept and thus, in perception, concepts mediate between the object and 
the subject. Logically, however, the class precedes the concept. One cannot have a class if 
there is no concept providing the comprehension of it. 
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Figure 1. The cognitive trajectory in Prieto’s model. 
The arrow at the top, with object and subject in its ends, illustrates the fact that an object a specifies the 
sensorial organs by means of modificating them. The circle at the top indicates the universe of discourse that 
gets established by the sensorial modifications. The arrow that connects the top circle with the lower circle 
indicates that the universe of discourse gets structured into non universal classes. The circle at the right side is 
the class of concepts in relation to which the classes of objects are established. The double arrow uniting the 
lower circles (the class of objects and the class of concepts) indicates the relation of pertinence between them, 
and the fact that they are depending on one another. The dotted arrow that goes from the universe of discourse 
of sensorial modifications to the class of concepts illustrates that concepts mediate between subject and 
object. 
 
So, substance depends on form, but at the same time form depends on substance. 
The manifestable characteristics of an object are substance. They become manifested 
characteristics of an object in the aesthesis. In this processes they are conceived by the 
subject as proper features of the object. On this basis, the object is recognized as realizing a 
concept; thus the object is now form. However, the features in form must have a material 
correlate, because difference is a property of the object as substance (matter), not of the 
object as form. Thus we need to take into account the material dimension of the object in 
every act of knowledge. This can be represented as in figure 2. 
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Figure 2. A possible way of representing a cognitive cycle based on Prieto’s proposals.  
If the cycle would start at Form, accepting that it is presupposed by substance, the cycle shows that there is a 
need to have material correlates, which lead to substance, and to (cognitive) intentionality. This figure 
illustrates the main idea behind the proposal of articulating teleodynamics with pertinence.  
 
The identity of the object in knowledge depends on whether the object manifests the 
features that constitute the comprehension of a class. These features are pertinent features. 
Pertinence is the key notion for making sense of Prieto’s model of cognition, for as he 
claims: “the [pertinence] of the [pertinent] features of an object is not an intrinsic quality of 
these features, but it depends finally upon the practice in regard to which the subject 
considers this object” (Prieto 1994: 794). To say that every classification presupposes a 
pertinence principle, amounts very much to say that every act of knowledge presupposes a 
practice. 
From this point of view, knowledge is classification and classification is always 
teleological. There is always an aim in regard to which a given set of objects is considered, 
and it is in relation with that aim that classes of objects are established. The backbone of 
the whole process is pertinence. Thus, we can say it very clearly now, ententional 
phenomena functions via pertinence. The constraints on teleodynamic organization at the 
level of form determine an organism’s capacity of distinguishing between objects realizing 
this or that concept, and prevent it from recognizing certain objects that do not realize any 
of the concepts with which the organism can operate. Constraints are correlates of 
substance, for they determine to which class an object can belong; properly speaking they 
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would be the interface between matter and semiotic substance, prior to properly correlate it 
with form via teleodynamic organization. A possible way to represent this would be as in 
fig 3. It can be seen in it that there is a tension between form and substance on the one 
hand, and constraints and teleodynamics on the other. At the centre of this tension, semiotic 
structures, and therefore ententional phenomena are located. 
 
Fig. 3. The semiotic structure results from a tension between form and substance.  
The arrows represent the tensions that are resolved in the semiotic structure and the curves show 
that the notions at the edges are correlates 
 
When we include teleodynamics into Prieto’s model, we can solve the problem of 
how the calculus of pertinent features in form is established. Form becomes in a certain 
way embodied in an organism’s teleodynamic organization, or to put it in other words, 
teleodynamics are a correlate of form. Form, then, can be defined as the class of classes of 
needs of an organism. From this point of view we can start distinguishing Prieto’s notion of 
substance more clearly from that of Hjelmslev. Since teleodynamic organization is what it 
is because there is an absence in regard to which organization is shaped, form depends on 
substance in a very strong sense. 
Teleodynamics and constraints provide Prieto’s model with a mechanism for 
explaining the specification of the sensorial organs carried out by an object in aesthesis, but 
furthermore, it provides a key argument for expanding Prieto’s theory beyond 
anthroposemiosis. Since teleodynamics is what enables a system to actively use its extrinsic 
conditions as means of preservation, it endows the system with the capacity to choose, it 
gives volition to the system, and capacity, even if very minimal, to change its environment. 
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This is nothing more than the capacity of executing practices, and practices are always 
accompanied by pertinence. What is important is that the capacity to choose is also located 
by Prieto at the core of meaning-making. 
In one of his late articles (Prieto 1993), Prieto presents his view of semiology. He 
claims that semiology is the study of the raison d’être of knowledge of material reality 
(Prieto 1993: 21). Every material object can be known, from this point of view, as the mean 
to achieve a given goal; however, Prieto claims, the object must suffer a transformation that 
enables it to actually be the mean to attain a goal. The cause of this transformation is the 
body of the subject, which at the same time must be transformed as well. Prieto’s example 
is that of a hand. In order for an object to function as a tool, for instance, the hand of the 
subject must be transformed into a “grabbing hand” (Prieto 1993: 27). The transformation 
of the body of the subject is what defines the practice, but it should be noted that this 
transformation should not be an effect of the action of another material object excerpted on 
the body of the subject; for the body of the subject to become a cause without being an 
effect, the transformation it suffers must be able to not happen. This means that for there to 
exist a practice, the subject must choose to transform its body. 
The transformation of the body of the subject, and the ability of the subject to 
transform it, requires the subject to be aware of its own numerical identity, of its 
individuality, via the recognition of the numerical identity of its body as a material object. 
The discovery of the body as an object in human beings is what sets them apart, according 
to Prieto, from other animals (Prieto 1993: 29-30). By virtue of this discovery, human 
beings can differentiate between the consciousness they have of the objects, and the objects 
themselves, and it is this capacity what sets human beings apart from nature and into 
culture. This idea is very much in line with Deely’s characterization of man as able to 
consider semiosic relations in their own beings of relations (cf. Deely 2009). 
The most important point of Prieto’s ideas is the role of decision in practice. Indeed, 
if practice is only possible by decision, and practice entails pertinence and semiosis, 
decision is the missing link in the articulation between Prieto and Deacon. The 
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transformation of the environment using the own body as a medium could be in fact not 
only a trait of anthroposemiosis, but of semiosis tout court; of ententionality.  
The expanded model that reunites both of the theories we have examined would 
then contemplate the following aspects: 
1) Knowing is founded in aesthesis. This means that knowing starts with 
intersubjectivity in Deely’s sense of the word. 
2) In the aesthesis of a portion of reality, the sensorial organs of the subject, or to 
say it in another words, its cognitive capacities get specified by the object. This 
is the realm of cognitive intentionality. At this point there is an immediate union 
between the knower and the known.  
3) Material features are recognized by the subject as being manifested by the object 
and a universe of discourse of objects is established. This is a result of the 
interplay between, on the one hand, substance and constraints as correlated 
notions and form and teleodynamics on the other. 
4)  The universe of discourse is structured. Here teleodynamics is the key factor. At 
this point the implicit calculus of features entailed by the specific teleodynamic 
organization of a system results in the establishing of form. Substance thus 
becomes in-formed. 
5) The previous aspects are only possible because the system can recognize 
absences, and thus it has needs. To recognize absences means that the system 
can operate with represented ends. This does not means that the system is fully 
aware of its needs, of its numerical identity, or of its identity as an object, but it 
do means that the system is able to operate with at least two mutually exclusive 
classes, and thus it can face logical conflicts and decide which of the two 
simultaneous options to choose. This is the realm of intentionality as volition. 
In a certain way, however, the expanded model we presented leans very much 
toward a naturalistic explanation of semiosis. The more interesting way to continue this 
research is to compare our conclusions with a thorough analysis of umwelt theory at the 
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light of modeling systems theory. It seems to us that such a path will be true to our aim of 
looking at biosemiotics in order to make useful contributions to general semiotics. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
We have provided a possible way to bring together the semiotic theories of Terrence 
Deacon and Luis Prieto. Starting by providing a definition of intentionality was very 
helpful, in order to concentrate on cognitive intentionality as specification of the senses, or 
even, of the cognitive faculties of the subject of knowledge. By means of our presentation 
of Deacon’s theory we saw that our understanding of intentionality was useful for this 
work. Indeed, this specification of the senses exhibited by intentional phenomena was to be 
found at the core of ententional phenomena. The analysis of Deacon’s concept of emergent 
dynamics show how this property can come to existence from an evolutionary point of 
view. We saw, at the same time that ententional phenomena imply a pertinence principle, 
and we saw that this pertinence principle was involved in the recognition of features and 
differences by an organism in its environment. This led us to consider some conceptions by 
other biosemioticians, namely Hoffmeyer’s semiotic freedom and Kull’s logical conflict. 
Our analysis of Prieto’s theory enabled us to signal the lacking of an intentional 
component in Prieto’s model of semiosis for it to become a proper general model of 
semiosis. One of the achievements of our exposition was to show that Prieto’s theory 
follows Hjelmslev very closely, in fact, from an epistemic point of view, Prieto is loyal to 
Hjelmslev. However, the main difference between them is, as we saw, that Prieto’s theory 
points toward a certain type of ontological realism, while Hjelmslev’s remains mute on 
regarding this question. 
Finally, we saw that it is possible to articulate both Deacon's and Prieto's approaches 
regardless of different orientations and scope of their theories. It seems, thus, that it is 
possible to have productive interactions between Peircean and Saussurean oriented theories 
from the point of view of general semiotics. 
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The consequences of this theoretical point of view can only be tested by applying 
the model we have constructed to analysis of semiotic phenomena. We believe it should be 
possible to apply it to a variety of phenomena other than those studied by biosemiotics. The 
more interesting field seems of course cultural semiotics. The relations between form and 
substance in anthroposemiosic semiotic structures should be determined in greater detail if 
we take into account the notions of constraints and how they determine a system’s 
organization. 
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Resümee 
Ententsionaalsus ja kohasus 
 
Käesoleva töö eesmärgiks on kokku tuua Terrence Deaconi  biosemiootiline ja Louis Prieto 
antroposemiootiline teooria. Peamiseks sihiks on nende teooriate integreerimine mudeliks, 
mis võimaldaks mõista üldiseid semioosilisi võimeid. Selle uurimuse olulisus tõukub 
sellest, et strukturaalse suunitlusega mõtlejad, nagu Prieto, ei ole biosemiootikas, mis 
lähtub peamiselt peirceaanlikust paradigmast, enamasti esindatud ning käesolevas töös 
püütakse näidata, mil määral aitavad saussureaanlikust lähtekohast tõukuvad teooriad 
mõista semioosi kõikvõimalikel tasanditel.  
Selle töö peamiseks taustprobleemiks on intentsionaalsus, mistõttu töö esimene peatükk 
tegelebki intentisonaalsuse defineerimisega. Sellel kontseptil on mitmeid erinevaid 
tähendusi ning käesolevas töös lähtutakse ennekõike kognitiivse intentsionaalsuse 
skolastilisest definitsioonist, mis, lihtsustatult, sätestab teadja ja teadaoleva vahele vahetu 
ühenduse täpsustusena, mille teostab teadaolev teadja tunnetuses. See saab töö läbivaks 
teljeks. Oluline on tähelepanu juhtida ka sellele, et skolastikute jaoks ei olnud 
intentsionaalsus üldises mõttes piiratud üksnes mentaalsete nähtustega, vaid puudutas ka 
füüsilisi nähtuseid. Meie ei lähtu siiski sellest üldisemast tähendusest, selgitades omapoolse 
kitsenduse tagamaid töö esimeses peatükis. Ehkki meie kasutuses on see mõiste kitsam, on 
see siiski piisavalt üldine, hõlmamaks ka mittementaalseid nähtuseid. See omakorda on 
seotud ühega kahest töös kesksest mõistest. 
Sellele järgnevad peatükid tegelevad Deaconi ja Prieto teooriatega ning neis tutvustatakse 
kahte antud töös keskset mõistet: ententionaalsus ja kohasus. Teine peatükk keskendub 
ententsionaalsuse mõistele, mille Deacon pakkus välja oma teoses Incomplete Nature, How 
Mind Emerged from Matter. Lühidalt võib ententsionaalsust määratleda intentsionaalsuse 
laiendusena mentaalsest sfäärist väljapoole. See viitab nähtustele, mis on loomuldasa 
lõpetamata, kõikvõimalikele nähtustele, mis osutavad loomuldasa millelegi muule 
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väljaspool ennast. Sellisena sisaldab see mõiste äratundmist, et intentsionaalsus on elusa 
fundamentaalne atribuut. Deaconi jaoks on ententsionaalsus emergentne omadus, st terviku 
omadus ja sõltub tervikut moodustavate osade vahelistest suhetest. Sellisena peab 
ententsionaalsuse mõiste toetuma emergentse dünaamika teooriale, mis sialdab kolme 
üksteisele ehituvat korrastustasandit: homeodünaamika, morfodünaamika ja 
teleodünaamika. Iga korrastuse tasand sõltub eelnevast ning tendentsid, mis tekivad 
madalamates astmetes, on aluseks kõrgemate astmete tendentsidele. Teleodünaamiline 
korrastus puudutab süsteemide võimet väliseid tingimusi aktiivselt enese alalhoiuks 
kasutada ning see omakorda võimaldab ententsionaalsuse teket.    
Kolmas peatükk käsitleb Luis Prieto esitatud kohasuse mõistet. Ent selle mõiste selgitamine 
ja ententsionaalsuse mõistega sidumine eeldab esmalt paari strukturalistlikus traditsioonis 
olulise mõiste tutvustamist, milleks on vorm ja substants. Prieto määratles nende kahe 
mõiste vahelise dihhotoomia kognitiivsest perspektiivist ümber ning selle opositsiooni 
temapoolset määratlust on võimalik tõlgendada semiootilise realismi vaatepunktist, mis 
viib strukturalistliku semiootika peirceaanlikule paradigmale lähemale. Selle lähenemise 
järgi on substantsil materiaalse tegelikkuse ontoloogilised tunnused ning mistahes süsteem 
valib nendest materiaalsetest tunnustest mingi väikese hulga ja muudab need asjakohasteks. 
Need, objekti materiaalsusest tulenevad tunnused, mis on süsteemi jaoks kohased, ongi 
Prieto vaatepunktist vormiks. Seega substants viitab ainele omastele piirangutele, mis 
semiootilisele süsteemile teatud määral rakenduvad ja vorm (sel määral kui see on vormitud 
substants) muutub süsteemispetsiifiliseks tegelikkuseks. Kuna vormi ja substantsi vahel 
loodud seos on semioosiline seos, ei ole see taandatav kummalegi neist osapooltest (selles 
mõttes on see suprasubjektiivne, kui kasutada Deely mõistet); vorm on substantsist sõltuv 
või, teisti sõnastades, süsteemispetsiifiline tegelikkus on sõltuv süsteemi välistingimuste 
materiaalsest tegelikkusest. Ent substants on samuti sõltuv vormist, kuna 
süsteemispetsiifilist tegelikkust moodustavate asjakohaste tunnuste sisseseadmine eelneb 
loogiliselt nende tunnuste identifitseerimisele materiaalses tegelikkuses. 
Neljas peatükk sisaldab töö põhiseisukohta, mis seisneb idees, et Prieto pakutud nihe 
võimaldab vormi ja substantsi vastandusel funktsioneerida semioosi üldise mudeli ühe 
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põhiteljena, mida saab edukalt rakendada ka muudele semioosilistele nähtustele kui 
antroposemioosilistele (kuigi Prieto ise ei arvestanud võimalusega ehitada inimsemioosist 
üldisema semioosi mudelit). Prieto mudelis on puudu piisavalt üldine mehhanism, mis 
seletakse taju üldisemalt intentsionaalse nähtusena; selle probleemi saab lahendada, sidudes 
ententsionaalsuse kaudu vormi ja substantsi teooria ning emergentse dünaamika 
biosemiootiline teooria. Siinse töö peamiseks väiteks on see, et teleodünaamiline korrastus 
loob süsteemi, millel on võime substantsi vormina kujundada: teleodünaamiline korrastus 
eeldab kohasuse põhimõtet, mis valiks süsteemi välistingimuste kohased tunnused (s.o. 
substantsi) ja klassifitseeriks need (vormina), kindlustamaks süsteemi säilumise. Sellelt 
pinnalt pakutakse töös välja laiendatud mudel, mis ühendab Deaconi ja Prieto teooriad. 
Nende lähenemiste kombinatsioon on näiliselt tänases biosemiootika teoorias puudu ja see 
pakub lisaväärtuse, tuues Saussure’ist lähtuvad teooriad biosemiootikasse ning samas 
ergutades ka strukturaalset traditsiooni üldsemiootikas. 
 
 
 
 
 
